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INJURED WOMEN BEFORE 













 How did early American tort law treat women?  How were they expected 
to behave, and how were others expected to behave towards them?  What 
gender differences mattered, and how did courts deal with those differences?  
These are the issues this Article explores.  My aim is to illuminate the 
common law of torts and its relation to and with ideas about gender 
difference, by focusing on three sets of cases involving injured women, 
spanning the time between approximately 1860 and 1930.1   
 My conclusions run counter to two approaches scholars have frequently 
taken in analyzing gender and the common law of torts.  Some tort schola rs 
neglect gender completely, omitting it as an important axis of analysis.  For 
example, in 1972, in his influential article A Theory of Negligence, Judge 
Richard Posner wrote of cases involving injuries to train passengers boarding 
and disembarking, the type of case discussed in Part III of this Article.2  
Posner summarized the doctrinal rules as follows: 
                         
*Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division; J.D., Yale 
Law School, 1993; B.A., Yale College, 1989.  The opinions expressed in this Article are mine 
and not those of the Department of Justic e.  I want to thank Samuel Bagenstos, Hugh Baxter, 
Jules Coleman, William Forbath, Thomas Green, Jennifer Mnookin, and Peter Schuck for 
reading earlier drafts.  All errors, faults, and flaws that remain do so despite their helpful 
comments.  In addition, I should note the benefit I had of seeing Barbara Welke's valuable 
work Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law of Accidental Injury, 1870 - 1920, 19 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 369 (1994), in an earlier, unpublished form, some months after I began work on 
the student paper that, much revised, became Part III of this Article.  Her manuscript alerted 
me to some of the cases discussed here. 
1I chose 1860 as the starting date because that year roughly corresponds with the 
beginning of modern tort law.  See, e.g., G. EDWARD W HITE, TORT LAW IN A MERICA: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 - 19 (1980).  It is, in any event, the approximate year of the earliest 
cases I was able to find in these categories, except for one 1837 woman-driver case discussed 
at text accompanying infra note 108 - 111.  The end date is slightly more arbitrary.  I simply 
wanted a long enough time span from the beginning date to get a sense of any historical 
progression, and enough cases after any observed change to provide an analyzable set. 
2Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
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The parties’ reciprocal duties in the boarding and alighting situations 
were rather particularized.  The railroad had to provide the passenger a 
safe method of ingress and egress and the train had to remain stopped 
long enough for the passenger to get to (or from) his seat.  The 
passenger, in turn, had to wait for the train to stop, or at least slow 
considerably, before getting on or off; he had to watch where he was 
stepping; and he had to use the route to and from the train provided by 
the company.3 
 
 The cases discussed in Part III make clear that when this passage omits 
gender, and when it hides women plaintiffs, by using masculine language, it 
erases something that contemporary courts considered crucial.  Posner, of 
course, is not alone.  As feminist legal scholars surveying pre-feminist tort 
scholarship and teaching have found, both gender and women have often been 
notable in those arenas by their absence in analysis and their invisibility in 
reporting.4  The erasure of gender is especia lly marked in the tort theory 
scholarship of the 1950s.  For example, Fleming James wrote an entire article 
about “The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases,” treating 
such attributes as “judgment,”5 “knowledge,”6 “experience,”7 “skill,”8 
“physical, mental, and emotional characteristics,”9 “age,”10 and “sanity”11 
without even once discussing gender, or mentioning that women play a role in 
the tort system. 
 Other scholars, though not themselves erasing women or omitting gender, 
find that historical tort law itself committed a similar act of exclusion or 
subordination in the development of an objective standard of care.  In 1977, in 
a study of tort law’s “reasonable man” standard, Ronald Collins wrote that 
“exhaustive research has unearthed no common-law reference to a ‘reasonable 
                         
3Id. at 60.  
4See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
3, 22 - 25 (1988) [hereinafter Bender, Lawyer’s Primer]; Leslie Bender, An Overview of 
Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993) [hereinafter Bender, Overview] 
(surveying scholarship up to 1992 that corre cts this imbalance); Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts 
as If Gender Matters: Intentional Torts , 2 VA. J. SOC.  POL’Y & L. 115, 115 n.1 (1994) 
[hereinafter Bender, Teaching Torts] (surveying like scholarship between 1992 and 1994); 
Lucinda Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM  41, 57 - 59, 63 - 65 (1989); Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, 
Wade & Schwartz Torts Casebook , 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 495 (1988).  
5Fleming James, The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 M O. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1951). 
6Id. at 5. 
7Id. 
8Id. at 15. 
9Id. at 17. 
10Id. at 22. 
11Id. 
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woman.’”12  Instead, he argued, courts that considered the obligations of 
women as potential injurers or victims of injury found that they were 
incapable of reason, and so were to be treated, like children, as somewhat 
incompetent in the eyes of the law.  This he called the “unreasonable woman” 
standard.13  Judge Guido Calabresi similarly points out that the “reasonable 
man” used to be described, as well as named, in explicitly masculine phrases; 
he was “the man who takes the magazines at home and in the evening pushes 
the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves.”14  Other scholars join Collins and 
Calabresi in their belief that tort law used to measure care-taking by a 
“reasonable man” standard that was, not just linguistically but truly, a 
masculine one — that the construction was the once-unnoticed emblem of the 
legal system’s substantive oppression and exclusion of women.15  For 
                         
12Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the 
“Reasonable Man,” 8 RUT. - CAM. L.J. 311, 315 (1977).  Collins argued that women have 
been named “unreasonable” by the common law, and that the construct of the reasonable man 
is an instrument of women’s oppression.  Id. at 315 - 20.  
13Id. at 317.  A famous 1927 satire by A.P. Herbert offers a similarly depressing view of 
the common law of torts: 
 
[I]n all the mass of authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is no 
single mention of a reasonable woman . . . for the simple reason that no such being 
is contemplated by the law; that legally at least there is no reasonable woman. . . .  
It is no bad thing that the law of the land should here and there conform with the 
known facts of everyday experience.  The view that there exists a class of beings, 
illogical, impulsive, careless, irresponsible, extravagant, prejudiced, and vain. . . is 
one which should be as welcome and as well accepted in our Courts as it is in our 
drawing-rooms.  I find therefore that at Common Law a reasonable woman does not 
exist. 
 
 A LAN PATRICK HERBERT, Fardell v. Potts, in M ISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 18 - 
20 (1927).  Herbert’s words, of course, were only mock-judicial.  And he came down just as 
hard on the reasonable man as he did on the unreasonable woman  —  the reasonable man is, he 
wrote, “[d]evoid, in short, of any human weakness, with not one single saving vice,   . . . [an] 
excellent but odious character.”  Id. at 16. 
14GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, A TTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW 
PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 23, 139 n.94 (1985) (quoting Hall v. Brooklands 
Auto Racing Club, 1 K.B. 205, 224 (1933) (quoting unnamed “American author”)). 
15This point about the reasonable man standard has become something of a new received 
wisdom.  See, e.g., Hillary Allen, One Law for All Reasonable Persons, 16 INT’L J. SOC’Y AND 
L. 419 (1988); Bender, Lawyer’s Primer, supra note 4, at 22 - 25; Martha Chamallas, 
Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: 
A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 74 (1994) [hereinafter Chamallas, 
Questioning Data]; Finley, supra note 4, at 57 - 59, 63 - 65; Caroline Forell, Reasonable 
Woman Standard of Care, 11 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Forell, Reasonable 
Woman]; Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 769, 770 - 80 (1994) [hereinafter Forell, Essentialism]; Robert Unikel, Comment, 
“Reasonable Doubts”:  A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in American 
Jurisprudence, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 326, 330 - 32 (1992); Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses, 
Reasonable Women and Divorce: The Gap Between Reality and the Internal Revenue Code, 3 
M ICH. J. GENDER & L. 421, 458 - 65 (1996).  
Barbara Welke presents a more nuanced view, discussed below at text accompanying 
notes 143 - 146.  See Barbara Y. Welke, Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law of 
Accidental Injury, 1870 - 1920, 19 L. & SOC.  INQUIRY 369 (1994) [hereinafter Welke, 
Unreasonable Women].  In the final analysis, Welke concludes that the “reasonable man” 
standard was “patterned on the image of a man,” but that women were not held to this 
masculine standard. Id. at 370 n.4.  Rather, courts “defined due care differently for women 
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example, Leslie Bender writes: 
It was originally believed that the ‘reasonable man’ standard was 
gender neutral. ‘Man’ was used in the generic sense to mean person or 
human being. But man is not generic except to other men. . . . As our 
social sensitivity to sexism developed, our legal institutions did the 
‘gentlemanly’ thing and substituted the neutral word ‘person’ for 
‘man.’ . . . Although tort law protected itself from allegations of 
sexism, it did not change its content and character.16 
 
 The accusation of erasure draws strength from canonical historical texts 
that explain the rules that guided early tort law’s treatment of many 
“difference” issues.  In 1837, in the famous case Vaughn v. Menlove,17 the 
British Court of Common Pleas held that despite the apparently limited 
mental faculties of the adult defendant, he was answerable for harm he caused 
others in deviating from an objectively reasonable standard of behavior.  A 
defendant could not escape liability, wrote Chief Justice Tindal, by arguing 
that he had acted to the best of his own ability: 
 
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be 
co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as 
variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to 
adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as 
a man of ordinary prudence would observe.18 
 
Justice Holmes enshrined this “objective” standard in The Common Law, 
writing: 
 
                                                           
and men,” and, as the title of her article suggests, treated women as “unreasonable.”  Id. at 
370. 
16Bender, Lawyer’s Primer, supra note 4, at 22.  See also Robin L. West, Relativism, 
Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1473, 1491 (1990) (book review) (“The reasonable person 
doctrine in tort law is vulnerable to the complaint that it reifies the interests of some groups 
while subordinating others.”). 
17132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837) (Tindal, C.J.). 
18Id. at 493.  The case probably marked the first appearance of the “reasonable man” by a 
slightly different name.  The concept was familiar, however, from the law of bailments.  See 
SIR W ILLIAM JONES, A N ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 11 (1796) (“prudent man”). 
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The standards of the law are standards of general application. The 
law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, 
intellect, and education which make the internal character of a given 
act so different in different men.  It does not attempt to see men as 
God sees them, for more than one sufficient reason . . . .  [W]hen 
men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of 
individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to 
the general welfare . . . .  The law considers, in other words, what 
would be blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence, and determines liability by that . . . .19 
 
Thus, in the nineteenth century, courts held judgment-deficient adults to the 
same standard of reasonable behavior as they held the unimpaired.20 
 Looking at other kinds of tort parties, well-known nineteenth-century 
sources indicate that under the common law, a person with a physical 
disability, unlike a person with a mental disability, could escape tort liability 
by acting with “such care as persons of like . . . condition are accustomed to 
use.”21  And, similarly, we know that tort law made allowances for the 
inherent deficiencies of childhood.  Again, looking at Holmes’ writings:  “So 
it is held that, in cases where he is the plaintiff, an infant of very tender years 
                         
19OLIVER W ENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 - 09 (1881).  Acceptance of the 
s tandard was by no means universal during this Article’s period.  See, e.g., Hainlin v. Budge, 
47 So. 825, 833 (Fla. 1908) (critiquing the “artificial or mythical ‘reasonably prudent man,’” 
and noting that if “the conduct of either sex [must] be measured by the standard of the 
mythical ‘reasonably prudent person’ [then] . . . the difficulties of the jury are increased”). 
20For early discussions more explicit on this point, if less iconic than Vaughn v. Menlove, 
see cases cited in the Reporters Notes to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1977).  
The Restatement itself presents a modern -day version of the same rule.  Id. (“Unless the actor 
is a child, his insanity or other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for 
conduct which does not conform to the standard of a reasonable man under like 
circumstances.”).  As in the nineteenth century, the standard presented is an objective one. 
21Stringer v. Frost, 19 N.E. 331, 333 (Ind. 1888).  But see SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, 1 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN A LL RELATIONS § 336 (2d ed. 1901) 
[hereinafter THOMPSON ON NEGLIGENCE ] (stating as the rule that greater than ordinary care is 
required of people who are blind, d eaf, aged, or otherwise infirm); accord Karl v. Juniata 
County, 56 A. 78 (Pa. 1903).  There was a contest between these two doctrinal positions, 
though it is hard to see that any practical difference resulted.  The rule that disabled people are 
held to a s tandard of care set by reference to an ordinary level of care taken by persons with 
the same disability eventually won out, and this has remained the applicable standard.  See, 
e.g., Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen, 338 P.2d 743, 746 (Wash. 1959) (finding that a disabled 
person is liable only if that person did not act with “the care which a reasonable person under 
the same or similar disability would exercise under the circumstances”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 C (“If the actor is ill or otherwise physically disabled, the standard 
of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man 
under like disability.”).  
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is only bound to take the precautions of which an infant is capable ; the same 
principle may be cautiously applied where he is defendant.”22 
 But The Common Law and the other canonical historical texts of torts 
contain no information about the place of women in the nineteenth-century 
common-law vision of the world.   And notwithstanding the recent explosion 
in feminist torts scholarship,23 little scholarship actually examines and 
discusses old accident cases to test a hypothesis of exclusion and consistent 
oppression against their particular language and holdings.  This Article essays 
such a test, using as the field of study three categories of cases, involving 
injuries to women who were passengers in cars and wagons, injuries to female 
drivers of wagons, and injuries to women boarding and disembarking from 
trains.  Reported decisions in these categories evince common understandings 
of gender differences courts considered relevant: that wives had less authority 
than husbands, that women were less competent in the public sphere of 
transportation than men, and that women were less physically agile than men.  
This Article presents the interplay of those understandings and tort doctrine.  
The results of this interplay were as complex as gender difference and tort law 
themselves, and my project is one of thick description — to complicate rather 
than to present a unified field theory of gender and tort.24  Nonetheless, one 
solid conclusion to be drawn from all three categories is that, as might be 
expected given the existence of female accident victims and the importance of 
the ideology of gender to social ordering, the accusation of erasure of gender 
difference is incorrect.  Far from naively erasing gender by subsuming women 
into the male category of “reasonable men” or a purportedly neutral, but no 
                         
22HOLMES, supra note 19, at 109.  For a discussion of the standard of care as applied to 
children, see, e.g., 1 THOMPSON ON NEGLIGENCE , supra note 21, at § 36, 37; Francis H. 
Bohlen, Liability in Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 M ICH. L. REV. 9 (1924). 
23For surveys of the literature, see sources cited supra note 4. 
24Indeed, any attempt at a unified field theory could hardly rest solely on cases about 
injured women.  Men, too, have g ender, and early tort law did not limit its concern with 
gender roles and gender difference to cases involving women.  The scope of this Article is, 
however, of necessity limited, and the cases presented here only hint at how tort law dealt 
with gender in cases involving male accident victims.  See Central of Georgia Ry. v. Carlisle, 
56 So. 737, 738 (Ala. Civ. App. 1911) (duty of railroad to render a passenger assistance in 
boarding and disembarking is “suspended” where the passenger is “attended by husband or 
friend apparently capable of giving the needed assistance,” and finding that husband in the 
case at bar could not be presumed unable to render assistance just because he carried a baby, 
“for at least one arm may have nevertheless been left entirely fre e and available for other 
uses”); Hurt v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 7 S.W. 1, 4 (Mo. 1888) (holding that railroad is 
negligent if it fails to stop at station long enough for a man to help his family disembark and 
declaring “[w]hen a man becomes a passenger on a railroad car with his wife and little ones, 
he is their guardian and protector; he has the supervision of their safety; and the family group, 
so far as the act of debarkation from the cars is concerned, is to be regarded to all intents and 
purposes as a unit and indivisible integer.”); Hager v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 104 A. 599, 600 
(Pa. 1918) (“[A]s a brakeman was present to help the ladies, it cannot be affirmed as a legal 
conclusion that Mr. Hager was negligent in failing to wait and assist his wife in alighting.”); 
Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. v. Yantis, 185 S.W. 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), discussed infra notes 
171 - 173 and accompanying text. 
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less male category of “reasonable persons,” courts actually treated gender as 
an important factor in assessing appropriate standards of care.25  Neither do 
the cases support a charge of invariable refusal to take account of women’s 
experience, or of consistent deprecation of women’s capabilities.  Each of the 
three categories of opinions serves as a case study of tort law’s intricate 
interaction with gender difference, illuminating the diversity of possible and 
actual legal approaches to thinking about women’s agency, authority, and 
capabilities.  Together, in rhetoric, analysis, and result, they present a world 
frequently, though not uniformly, friendly to women and their needs.26 
                         
25Indeed, even a primary basis of this particular accusation — the masculine sound of the 
phrase “reasonable man” — is less solid than the scholarship indicates.  First, very few early 
accident cases used a locution that emphasized “reason.”  Instead, the cases used constructions 
such as “prudence,” “ordinary prudence,” “care,” and “reasonable care” (words actually more 
suited to the subject of taking precautions and assessing risk).  Though it is probably best not 
to make too much of such vocabulary choices, “prudence,” in particular, has different gender 
connotations than “reason.”  Many have argued that the very concept of “reason” includes an 
anti-feminine subtext.  See, e.g., Bender, Lawyer’s Primer, supra note 4, at 23 (“Gender 
distinctions have often been reinforced by dualistic attributions of reason and rationality to 
men, emotion and intuition (or instinct) to women.”).  Prudence, by contrast, is a traditional 
girl’s name — it connotes, if anything, femininity rather than masculinity.  Moreover, tort law 
standards were being stated in terms of a “person” as well as a “man” from the very earliest 
days of American tort law.  Indeed, the very case in which the precise expression “reasonable 
man” seems to have appeared for the first time also used the words “reasonable person”: 
 
Negligence is the omission to do something that a reasonable man guided upon those 
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or 
doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.  The defendants 
might have been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted to do that 
which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person taking 
reasonable precautions would not have done. 
 
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049 (Ex. Ch. 1856) (Alderson, 
B.J.). Courts talked about “persons” both when women were involved, see, e.g., Bigelow v. 
Rutland, 58 Mass. 247, 248 (1849), and when men were involved, see, e.g., Railroad Co. v. 
Jones, 95 U.S. 439, 441 - 42 (1877). (negligence is “the failure to do what a reasonable and 
prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing 
what such a person under the existing circumstances would not have done”).  Note, however, 
that as discussed infra note 114, the word “person” is itself ambiguous — the non-gendered 
word could be a placeholder (telling the reader to fill in the gender of the relevant actor), an 
attempt at a more theoretical gender neutrality, or a random usage with no gender-related 
subtext at all. 
26This Article barely touches on issues of race and class raised by the cases.  It is worth 
noting that the three categories likely had accident victims with differing demographic profiles.  
The train cases mostly involved white women, of widely varying economic circumstances.  
There are, however, a number of reported opinions that make clear that the accident victim was 
African American.  See, e.g., cases cited infra note 167.  For useful discussions of some black 
women’s experience of train travel, and the interplay of race, gender, and class in the law 
governing train accommodations, see Patricia Hagler Minter, The Failure of Freedom:  Class, 
Gender, and the Evolution of Segregated Transit Law in the Nineteenth-Century South, 70 CHI. 
- KENT L. REV. 993 (1995); Barbara Y. Welke, When All the Women Were White, and All the 
Blacks Were Men: Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855 - 1914, 13 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 261 (1995) [hereinafter Welke, Road to Plessy]. 
By contrast, I did not see any cases in the two car and wagon categories that mentioned an 
African American accident victim.  This is suggestive, if not conclusive, that the victims in 
these cases were white.  Cf. Welke, Unreasonable Women, supra note 15, at 374 n.14 
(1994)(trial transcript in at least one train case revealed that accident victim, whose race was 
86 Harvard Women’s Law Journal [Vol. 21 
 
 In the first set of cases, discussed in Part I, women were injured as 
passengers in cars and wagons, usually when their husbands were driving.  
During the entire period surveyed, the cases establish courts’ views of the 
gendered relationship of wife to husband were of central analytic importance 
to their legal assessments of a woman’s right to recover against a third party 
who caused an accident.  Part I-A explains that although the cases display a 
relatively unchanging construction and presentation of the marital relationship 
— assigning the wife, at least in the public space of the roads, to a subordinate 
role to her husband — doctrinal changes from 1860 to 1930 precisely inverted 
the legal result of this assignment.  In the early part of the period, courts 
concluded from women’s subordinate position in marriage that a female 
passenger could not recover against a third party if her husband’s driving had 
negligently contributed to the accident.  But in 1890 or 1900, the results 
shifted, and courts concluded from the same subordination that a female 
passenger could recover in the same circumstances.  Part I-B demonstrates 
additionally that courts deciding whether a female passenger had herself been 
contributorially negligent also considered gender norms relevant to the 
inquiry; the idea that female authority and competence was lessened in public 
spaces contributed to some courts’ decisions that the injured women 
passengers before them had not been contributorially negligent. 
 Part II discusses a second set of cases, in which women drivers of wagons 
were injured. Some nineteenth-century court decisions in this category 
acknowledged and treated a perceived gender difference — that women were 
inferior drivers to men.  These opinions examined numerous doctrinal 
possibilities for the role gender should play, but settled on none of them, 
showing that a particular shared understanding about gender does not answer 
the question of how gender should bear on the injured female tort plaintiff’s 
right to recover.  Later opinions dealing with female drivers, by contrast, 
generally did not discuss gender at all.   
 Part III presents a third and final set of cases, in which women were 
injured boarding and disembarking from trains.  Underlying these decisions 
was yet another, and related, shared understanding of a gender difference — 
that women had more difficulty than men negotiating the world of train and 
streetcar travel.  Here, the defendant railroads’ legal status as common carriers 
                                                           
not mentioned in reported opinion, was African American).  The car and wagon opinions also 
reveal little information about economic status, but it is likely that the victims in these two 
categories were more uniformly middle class, since their families necessarily owned cars or 
wagons. 
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framed how judges incorporated perceived gender difference into their 
analysis.  As in the first set of cases, though not the second, as courts in this 
third category repeatedly confronted the perceived difference of women from 
men, and decided whether and how to accommodate that difference, some 
particularized rules and a fairly consistent caselaw developed.  In a contextual 
analysis that was not quite feminist, but not anti-feminist either, courts were 
more likely to invite women into public spaces and to enforce access rules for 
them than to exclude them, and were more likely to treat women as adults 
with adult capabilities and responsibilities of self-care, than as children unable 
to take care of their own safety.  
 Although their facts otherwise vary, the three sets of cases do share one 
obvious factual feature — all involve transportation-related injuries.  This 
focus on transportation reflects early tort law’s similar focus27 rather than any 
claim that gender was at issue only in this subset of personal injury cases.28  
And of course, courts also discussed gender in cases that did not involve 
accidents at all.  Divorce cases, rape cases, cases about such gendered torts as 
seduction or alienation of affections — all were among the arenas in which 
lawyers and courts discussed women and the law’s relationship to and 
expectations for them.  This Article presents just one piece of the puzzle. 
 
 
I.  WOMEN PASSENGERS 
 
 Historians agree that the dominant gender ideology in America by the mid-
nineteenth century and, with increasing ambivalence, into the early twentieth 
century, was that of “separate spheres.”29  The division of the world into 
                         
27According to Posner’s sampling of 1528 appellate court decisions from 1875 to 1905, 
transportation cases amounted to a la rge majority of the docket.  See Posner, supra note 2, at 
53 (Table 2), 54 (Table 3), 63 (Table 4); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
A MERICAN LAW 300 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing preeminence of railroads in early tort law); 
Welke, Unreasonable Women, supra note 15, at 381 - 82 (discussing frequency of railroad 
and streetcar injury in the late nineteenth century); Thomas D. Russell, Blood on the Tracks:  
Turn -of-the-Century Streetcar Injuries, Claims, and Litigation in Alameda County, California 
(1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
28As Professor Thomas Green commented to me, it would be interesting to examine the 
role gender played in tort cas es involving female workers, given the exceedingly complex 
gender ideology of work.  See, e.g., CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: W OMEN AND THE FAMILY IN 
A MERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 362 - 435 (1982); THOMAS DUBLIN, W OMEN 
A T W ORK : THE TRANSFORMATION OF W ORK AND COMMUNITY IN LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS, 
1826 - 1860 (1979); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO W ORK : A HISTORY OF W AGE-EARNING 
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1982); Julie Novkov, Liberty, Protection, and Women’s Work: 
Investigating the Boundaries Between Public and Private, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 857 (1996). 
29See, e.g., M ARY RYAN, W OMANHOOD IN A MERICA:  FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE 
PRESENT 113 - 19, 252 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing the “separate spheres” construct in its initial, 
antebellum flowering, and in its early twentieth century conflicted, but powerful, state); Linda 
K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric of Women’s 
History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9 (1988). 
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public and private, male and female worlds, created a tension for women 
using any means of transportation, because transportation took place in a 
public, male space.30  But ideology bent to convenience: women frequently, if 
less frequently than men, used trains, streetcars, wagons, or cars, even if their 
use of these means of transportation ran counter to the separate spheres 
concept.31  Both this Part and Part II deal with women in wagons or cars, the 
most “private” and therefore the most acceptable conveyances for women.  
Notwithstanding the privacy of a car, ideology dictated — and the cases 
reflect — that where a woman and a man used a car together during the time 
studied, almost invariably the man drove and the woman rode.32  When, as 
often happened, the driver was the passenger’s husband, and the car was 
involved in an accident, the issue frequently arose whether the alleged 
contributory negligence of the husband should be “imputed” to his wife.  As 
this Part describes, before 1890 - 1900, the contributory negligence of a 
husband-driver typically was imputed to his wife-passenger.  As statutory 
reforms to the law of coverture grew older, however, courts reversed this rule, 
applying instead the non-marital law of agency, and holding that because a 
wife did not have the right to control her husband, she was not responsible for 
his contributory negligence.  In addition, whatever the relation between 
passenger and driver, the question of the passenger’s own contributory 
negligence was also a nearly invariable subject of judicial attention, and one 
in which gender played a role, because courts incorporated the norms of 
female behavior into their analyses.33  This Part, then, uncovers and explores a 
                         
30See, e.g., VIRGINIA SCHARFF, TAKING THE W HEEL: WOMEN AND THE COMING OF THE 
M OTOR A GE 1 - 7 (1991). 
31See Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of 
Gendered Space, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 711 (1995) (discussing women’s persistent use of 
public transportation despite constraints imposed on women by social convention before the 
advent of the car); see also Patricia Cline Cohen, Safety and Danger: Women on American 
Public Transport, 1750 - 1850, in GENDERED DOMAINS: RETHINKING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN 
W OMEN’S HISTORY 109 (Dorothy O. Helly & Susan M. Reverby eds., 1992) (discussing 
women’s use of public transportation and accompanying risks of sexual proposition or 
assault).  
32See Southern Ry. v. Priester, 289 F. 945, 947 (4th Cir. 1923) (when husband and wife 
were together in car she owned, he drove; but she often drove in his absence);  see also 
SCHARFF, supra note 30, at 52 (“This companionable, hierarchical family, once set on wheels 
. . . [drove in] what would become an archetypal configuration: a man behind the wheel, a 
woman in the passenger’s seat . . . .”).  Scharff also asserts that “fragmentary evidence . . . 
suggests that before 1920, women comprised at most a small minority of drivers.”  Id. at 25 - 
26.   
33Contributory negligence was more important during the era discussed in this Article 
than it is today, for two reasons.  First, a finding of contributory negligence functioned as a 
complete bar to liability.  Second, courts then were more likely than they are now to consider 
whether there was contributory negligence as a matter of law.  My point is not that appellate 
and trial judges always took cases away from the jury in this way, but that they almost always 
considered that possibility, usually in some detail.  For scholarly discussions of judicial 
willingness or unwillingness to compensate victims of industry, see sources cited infra note 
59. 
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quite involved crossplay of gender and legal doctrine. 
 
 
A.  Imputed Negligence 
 
 The doctrine of “imputed negligence” originated in the 1849 British case 
of Thorogood v. Bryan,34 a tort action seeking damages for the death of a man 
who had just gotten off one omnibus, and was run over by another.35  The 
defendant—the owner of the second omnibus—argued that the first omnibus 
should not have let off passengers at the point where it stopped, and that its 
negligence in doing so should bar the action.  The Court of Common Pleas 
agreed, attributing the contributory negligence of the first omnibus’s operator 
to the decedent, and reversed the plaintiff’s jury verdict.  In its original 
application, assigning a common carrier’s negligence to its passenger, most 
American courts were not receptive to the Thorogood imputed negligence 
rule.36  In 1859, for example, the New York Court of Appeals held that the 
doctrine would not apply in New York.37  An injured passenger could not be 
held responsible for errors made by the carrier, the court said, because he had 
no control whatsoever over its operation.  “Even as to selection [of the 
carrier], he had only the choice of going by that railroad, or by none.”  In 
1886, in Little v. Hackett, 38 the issue came before the United States Supreme 
Court, which summarized and adopted the majority rule established by the 
state cases:  “The identification of the passenger with the negligent driver or 
the owner, without his personal co-operation or encouragement, is a 
gratuitous assumption.”39 
 But while American courts became reluctant to uphold a fictional 
identification of the passenger with the driver or conductor of a common 
carrier, for some years they were more willing to merge the identities of a 
                         
348 C.B. 115 (1848), overruled by Mills v. Armstrong (The Bernina), 12 P.D. 58, 13 App. 
Cas. 1 (1888). 
35An omnibus was a horse-drawn carriage operated like a modern city bus, taking on 
passengers for short trips along a set route.  Id. at 116, 117. 
36There were, however, scattered exceptions, chief among them Wisconsin and Montana 
(for a time), and Michigan (in non-common-carrier cases involving adults).  For detailed 
discussions, see Schultz v. Old Colony St. Ry., 79 N.E. 873 (Mass. 1907) (analyzing many 
state cases); Cuddy v. Horn, 10 N.W. 32 (Mich. 1881)(discussing law in Michigan); Mullen v. 
City of Owosso, 58 N.W. 663 (Mich. 1894) (same); Cuddy v. Horn, 10 N.W. 32 (Mich. 1881); 
Sherris v. Northern Pac. Ry., 175 P. 269 (Mont. 1918) (discussing law in Montana).  
37See Chapman v. New Haven R.R., 19 N.Y. 341, 344 (1859). 
38116 U.S. 366 (1886) (Field, J.). 
39Id. at 375. 
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wife-passenger and her husband-driver.  Courts found support in the 
authoritative Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, which stated in its first 
edition, in 1869, that although “a passenger in a public conveyance . . . is not 
precluded from recovering” because of the contributory negligence of the 
driver of that conveyance, the rule was the reverse “where a wife suffers an 
injury while under the immediate care of her husband.”40  The treatise offered 
no explanation, and cited just one case, Carlisle v. Town of Sheldon.41  
Shearman and Redfield ignored the actual holding of Carlisle, an 1866 
Vermont opinion premised entirely on Thorogood’s general rule that any 
driver’s negligence should be imputed to any passenger.  Carlisle expressly 
stated that there was “nothing in the marital relation” contributing to its 
analysis; the same result would obtain, said the court, for any passenger and 
any driver. 42 
 But a number of other courts agreed with Shearman and Redfield  that there 
was something different about a wife driven by her husband than a passenger 
in some other circumstance.  In a few cases, courts analyzed this not as a 
question of imputed negligence at all.  Rather, they held that because, under 
the common law, a husband was a necessary plaintiff in a suit for injuries to 
his wife, he could not “be permitted to create the cause of action by his 
negligent or fraudulent conduct and then reap the benefit which this interest in 
the action confers.” 43  The husband’s contributory negligence barred his 
action for personal injury to his wife, and she, herself, had no right to sue 
under the common law of coverture, which had “[f]or centuries [given] 
husbands rights in their wives’ property and earnings, and prohibited wives 
from contracting, filing suit, drafting wills, or holding property in their own 
names.”44 
 Usually, however, courts in husband-driver/wife-passenger cases did not 
explicitly rely on the common law of coverture.  Indeed, they could not, 
because most of the cases discussing the issue were decided after passage of 
marital status reform statutes allowing women to hold separate property and 
                         
40THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA REDFIELD, A T REATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 
§ 46, 48 - 50 (1st ed. 1869) [hereinafter SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE ]. 
4138 Vt. 440 (1866), obsolescence announced by Wentworth v. Waterbury, 96 A. 334 (Vt. 
1916). 
42See id. at 447. 
43Pennsylvania R.R. v. Goodenough, 28 A. 3, 4-5 (N.J. 1893).  Where this kind of 
analysis was the basis of a bar against recovery for injury to wife-passengers, subsequent 
passage of a “Married Women’s Property Act” changed the rule.  See Peskowitz v. Kramer, 
144 A. 604 (N.J. 1929) (overruling rule announced in Goodenough on basis of 1906 Married 
Women’s Property Act).   But under the same sort of rationale, even after married women 
were allowed to bring suits in their own right, courts generally held that a husband’s 
contributory negligence would bar his personal action for the wrongful death of his wife 
because the statutory action accrued to him.  See, e.g., Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor 
Bus Co., 141 N.E. 392 (Ill. 1923). 
44Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:  Adjudicating Wives’ Rights 
to Earnings, 1860 - 1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2127 (1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Marital Status 
Law]. 
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to bring their own lawsuits.45  More typical than discussion of coverture was 
the analysis in an 1877 Illinois case, in which the court commented that 
because “plaintiff placed herself in the care of her husband, and submitted her 
personal safety to his keeping,” any negligence on his part would be imputed 
to her.46  This “placing in the care” language does not, facially, explain why 
wives and husbands have any different relation for tort purposes than do 
passengers and common carriers.  After all, the passenger on a train relies on 
the care of the conductor.  Yet these decisions imputing the contributory 
negligence of a husband-driver to his wife-passenger were, generally, 
rendered despite courts’ rejection of the Thorogood rule.  The exploration of 
the topic of imputed negligence found in a jury charge in an 1891 federal case 
provides some insight.  The case concerned two adult siblings, driving 
together, who were in an accident; the sister-passenger was killed, and the 
question was whether the contributory negligence of the brother-driver would 
be imputed to her.  The judge explained to the jury that no such imputed 
negligence would be allowed, and he contrasted the situation, in dicta, to the 
imputation of the contributory negligence of a husband to his wife, and other 
like circumstances:  
                         
45See, e.g., 1861 Ill. Sess. Laws (Public) 143; Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa 383, 384 
(1871)(discussing Iowa’s marital status reform statutes); 1877 Conn. Public Acts, ch. 114.  
The first such a ct was adopted in Mississippi in 1839.  See FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
LAW, supra note 27, at 185; see also Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 
1800 _ 1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1398 (1983) (discussing Mississippi Act’s important 
precursors).  On the Married Women’s Property Acts generally, see id.; Richard H. Chused, 
Late Nineteenth Century Married Women’s Property Law: Reception of the Early Married 
Women’s Property Acts by Courts and Legislature, 29 A M. J. LEGAL HIST. 3 (1985); Linda E. 
Speth, The Married Women’s Property Acts, 1839 _ 1865: Reform, Reaction or Revolution?, 
in 2 W OMEN AND THE LAW: THE SOCIAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69 (D. Kelley Weisberg ed., 
1982); NORMA BASCH ,  IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN,  MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN 
NINETEENTH_CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); FRIEDMAN,  HISTORY OF A MERICAN LAW, supra 
note 27, at 185 - 86; KATHLEEN LAZAROU,  CONCEALED UNDER PETTICOATS:   MARRIED 
W OMEN’S PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF TEXAS, 1840 - 1913 (1986); M ARYLYNN SALMON, 
W OMEN AND the Law of Property in Early America (1986).  Siegel, Marital Status Law, supra 
note 44, at 2132 - 41, presents a helpful discussion of the historiography of marital status 
reform. 
46City of Joliet v. Seward, 86 Ill. 402, 402 - 03 (1877); see also, e.g., Yahn v. City of 
Ottumwa, 15 N.W. 257 (Iowa 1883); Nisbet v. Town of Garner, 39 N.W. 516, 517 (Iowa 
1890) (explaining Yahn, and distinguishing the case of a wife and husband from that of an 
unrelated passenger and driver) (repudiated exp ressly, but without analysis, by Willfong v. 
Omaha & St. L. R.R., 90 N.W. 358 (Iowa 1902)); Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Greenlee, 62 Tex. 
344 (1884); Prideaux v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513 (1878).  For cases adopting a rule 
of imputed negligence in thes e circumstances, and cited elsewhere in support of the rule, 
though they contain no discussion, see Huntoon v. Trumbull, 12 F. 844 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1882); 
Peck v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R.R., 50 Conn. 379 (1882).  Wisconsin was the only one of these 
jurisdictions that, as a general rule, imputed the negligence of drivers to passengers.  See 
discussion in Schultz v. Old Colony St. Ry., 79 N.E. 873 (Mass. 1907). 
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Now, there are certain circumstances, gentlemen, in which as a matter 
of law the negligence of a driver of a carriage . . . may be imputed to 
another person who occupies the vehicle with him; as, for instance, a 
father is driving, and has a child in the carriage, or a husband is driving, 
and has his wife there with him, or a guardian is driving with a ward 
that he has under his care.  [These] relations . . . are such that the law 
may impute as a matter of law the negligence of the father, or husband 
or guardian to the wife or the child or the ward, because . . . the one 
controls the other, and where ordinarily, in the ordinary affairs of life, 
we recognize the fact that the one trusts the other, and relies upon the 
other for protection; that is, a husband exercises protection, and the 
wife looks to the husband for protection.  So in the case of the child 
with the parent, and so in case of the ward with the guardian.47 
 
 The charge indicates that when some courts said that a woman had “placed 
herself in the care of her husband,” they meant far more than that she had 
trusted him to drive her safely, the meaning of the phrase for Thorogood.  The 
phrase appears, rather, to have encapsulated the same theory of marriage that 
underlay the superceded common law doctrine of coverture.  Indeed, 
Blackstone’s explanation of coverture in 1765 used language quite similar to 
this federal jury charge:  “[T]he husband and wife are one person in law [and] 
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the 
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband, 
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything.”48 
 In sum, in the earliest cases involving a contributorially negligent 
husband-driver, and his wife-passenger, the husband’s contributory 
negligence was frequently imputed to his wife, for the stated reason that she 
was subject to his control. The most persuasive explanation of the doctrine is 
that although the rule was announced after the technical end of coverture, it 
drew on the common law understanding of marital status, which subsumed 
wives’ identities in the identities of their husbands.   
 But this early majority rule was quickly reversed, beginning in the 1890s.49  
                         
47Lapsley v. Union Pac. R.R., 50 F. 172, 181 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1891); see also Nisbet v. 
Garner, 39 N.W. 516 (Iowa 1890)(contrasting the marital relation with that of a common 
carrier passenger and driver). 
481 W ILLIAM BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES ON TH E LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (1765) 
(citations omitted).   
49However, there was no reversal in many community property states, where injured wife-
passengers continued to be denied recovery for many years. See, e.g., Dunbar v. San 
Francisco-Oakland Terminal Rys., 201 P. 330, 332 (Cal. 1921) (holding that wife barred from 
recovering by the contributory negligence of her husband, both because she “is in [his] care” 
and, “regardless of whether or not she was in his care,” because “recovery for [the wife’s] 
injuries is community property, in which [the husband] shares and over which he has 
control”); Ostheller v. Spokane and I. E. R.R., 182 P. 630 (Wash. 1919); sources cited in 
Fleming James, Jr., Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REV. 340, 348 n.44 
(1954)[hereinafter James, Imputed Contributory Negligence].  In Texas, the first annunciation 
of imputed negligence, in 1884, did not rest on a community property theory. See Gulf C. & S. 
F. Ry. v. Greenlee, 62 Tex. 344 (1884).  But in 1891, a new rationale was announced.  
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. White, 15 S.W. 808 (Tex. 1891) (“With us, the proceeds of a recovery 
become community property, the recovery is as much for the husband as the wife, and for that 
reason his negligence would affect the right of recovery.”).  This holding remained the law in 
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Two historical developments are relevant to this reversal.  The first was the 
growing impact of the earlier-enacted Married Women’s Property Acts.  It 
seems to be generally true that the full impact of the reform statutes were felt 
only slowly.  For example, contemporary observer Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
noted the slow pace of change following enactment of the new statutes, 
writing in a letter that “[w]e already have a property law which in its 
legitimate effects must elevate the femme covert into a living, breathing 
woman—a wife into a property holder, who can make contracts, buy and sell.  
In a few years, we shall see how well it works.”50  Modern observers, as well, 
have written of the gradual reform effected by the Married Women’s Property 
Acts in other areas.51  Thus, it is a plausible explanation for the changing 
approach to claims of imputed negligence that courts increasingly realized in 
the late nineteenth century that the wave of earlier legislation had undermined 
common law tendencies to merge the identities of husbands and wives.  
Indeed, one 1894 Georgia case acknowledged as much.  The court cited the 
abundant authority for imputing a husband-driver’s negligence to his wife-
passenger, but rejected the rule, commenting that under Georgia law, she had 
a right to recover damages, which became her “separate and individual 
property, not subject to any debt or liability of the husband.”52  The court 
called the “doctrine . . . that . . . would seek to charge a wife with the 
negligence of her husband simply because of the marital relation existing 
between the two indefensible,” and emphasized that “the wife has distinct,
                                                           
Texas until a 1972 decision altered the community property rule.  Graham v. Franco, 488 
S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972). 
50See Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith (Jan. 3, 1856), in 2 ELIZABETH 
CADY STANTON: AS REVEALED IN HER LETTERS, DIARY , AND REMINISCENCES 63 (Theodore 
Stanton & Harriot Stanton Blatch eds., 1969) (1922).  I was alerted to this letter by Jacob Katz 
Cogan, Note, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and Suffrage in Nineteenth_Century 
America, 107 YALE L.J. 473, 487 (1997).  
51See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”:  Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2142 (1996) (“By mid_century, under the pressure of woman’s 
rights advocacy, state legislatures had begun to enact legislation reforming the status incidents 
of marriage; over the course of the century, these married women’s property acts gradually 
transformed a marital regime in which a husband ruled and repres ented his wife into one 
predicated in significant part on the juridical individuality of its partners.”); Siegel, Marital 
Status Law, supra note 44, at 2149 - 57 (describing slow progress of common law reform in 
New York state in late nineteenth century); see also Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 
N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 1993)  (“[R]everberations from the lifting of coverture slowly resounded 
through the common law.”).  
52Atlanta & C. Air-Line Ry. v. Gravitt, 20 S.E. 550, 556 (Ga. 1894). 
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 individual, legal rights.”53  As Clare Dalton commented, the logic of the Acts 
undermined “the ‘marital unity’ ideology, endowing women with legal 
personality and capacity, and thereby recognizing their individuality.”54  It 
seems likely that over time judges grew to understand and to apply that logic 
to accident cases involving husband-drivers and wife-passengers.   
 Growing juridical separation of husbands and wives created a kind of 
doctrinal vacuum in areas where decision rules had previously been based on 
such a merger.  In the area considered here, a “control test” lifted from other 
areas of tort law promptly filled that vacuum.   In the nineteenth century, the 
rule of respondeat superior dictated that a “master” (i.e., employer) would be 
held responsible in tort for the negligent act committed by its “servant” (i.e., 
employee).  Hirers of independent contractors, however, were not responsible 
for negligent acts committed by the contractors.  The common law test that 
evolved to distinguish employees from independent contractors focused on 
whether the alleged employer had the right to control the alleged employee.  
Use of a “control test” to distinguish “servants” from “contractors” was 
announced in both this country and in Britain by 1850.55  But the test gained 
wide currency only in the following decades.56  In the same time frame, the 
right to control became dispositive of liability under the law of the “joint 
enterprise,” under which persons with joint rights of control over an 
instrumentality of harm are jointly liable for any harm caused by either of 
them.57   
 These doctrinal developments—by which one party answered for a second 
party’s negligence only if the first party had either an equal or a superior right 
to control the second’s actions—took place in contexts relating to corporate 
and enterprise liability in the world of industry, with little similarity to the set 
of cases discussed here.58  In those contexts, the person or entity that was 
                         
53Id. 
54Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and 
Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 327 (1997). 
55See SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE supra note 40, at §§ 73 - 74, §§ 76 - 79, 82 
- 84, 85 - 92 (setting out test as established law); Gerald M. Stevens, The Test of the 
Employment Relation, 38 M ICH. L. REV. 188, 189 - 94 (1939) (discussing test’s origins).  
56See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909) (announcing the control 
test as binding under federal law, and citing cases from the 1890s and 1900s in support).  On 
the early cases and their fine distinctions, see Talbot Smith, Scope of the Business: The 
Borrowed Servant Problem , 38 M ICH. L. REV. 1222 (1940). 
57See Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 210 - 12 and sources 
there cited (1954); Joseph Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 
CORNELL L.Q. 320 (1931) (finding origin of joint enterprise doctrine’s control test in the law 
of respondeat superior); Gilbert K. Howard, Note, Negligence—Driver’s Negligence Imputed 
to Passenger in Suit by Third Party, 1 BAYLOR L. REV. 492 (1949) (origin of the doctrine of 
joint enterprise was in area of commercial ventures; extension to automobile cases is 
American innovation that focuses on mutual right of control and joint purpose, especially 
mutual right of control). 
58The sources and cases discussing the development of the control test cited above — and 
the cases they in turn rely on — are uniformly set in the arena of commerce and industry.  
Indeed, the rule of respondeat superior developed with the rise of corporate enterprise.  See 
Fowler V. Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, 
10 IND. L.J. 494, 495 (1934) (“modern law of respondeat superior” arose at the end of the 
seventeenth century, and both “the general principle of respondeat superior” and the “rule 
pertaining to independent contractors . . . are in a very large sense the product of industrialized 
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potentially vicariously liable was generally a defendant, not a plaintiff.  
Accordingly, the limit on vicarious liability imposed by these rules generally 
worked to limit compensation to victims of accidents.59  But as the rules 
                                                           
society”); Weintraub, supra note 57, at 337 (criticizing application of joint enterprise doctrine 
in automobile cases, and contrasting it with “application of a doctrine of imputed negligence 
to the true master and servant, agency, and partnership relations” because in that original 
arena the doctrine “seems reasonable, for usually such relations are connected with a 
commercial venture and the business man may well be deemed to calculate this risk with the 
expenses of his activities and perhaps insure against it”); John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for 
Tortious Acts: Its History, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN A NGLO-A MERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 536 
(Ernst Freund et al. eds., 1909) (rule of respondeat superior was “a conscious effort to adjust 
the rule of law to the expediency of mercantile affairs”).  Accounts of the relation between the 
imperatives of industrial expansion and respondeat superior and the independent contractor 
exception vary in their perspectives, but not in their focus on the commercial arena.  See 
Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 123 - 24 (1916) (“In a 
world where individual enterprise is so largely replaced, the security of business relationships 
would be enormously impaired unless we had a means of preventing a company from 
repudiating its servants’ torts.”); Roscoe T. Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good 
Life, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 512 (1935) (“It would have been inconceivable that any court, 
caught in this storm of [economic] expansion and imbued with the ideas of rugged 
individualism then current, could have done other than find the law necessary to make the 
contractor’s business thrive and to encourage immensely his employer.”).  More modern 
treatments of issues of vicarious liability and the control doctrine similarly focus on corporate 
behavior.  See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits 
of Employee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705 (1996); Alan Sykes, The Boundaries of 
Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related 
Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563 n.1 (1988); Alan Sykes, The Economics of 
Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1259 - 79 (1984) (analyzing various elements of and 
exceptions to the control doctrine in terms of economic efficiency). 
59The situation was complicated, however, by the fact that early control test cases very 
often involved a worker injured by another worker’s negligence.  In thes e circumstances, 
under the control test, if they were subject to the control of the same master they were “fellow 
servants” and their mutual employer was not liable; if they were subject to the control of 
different masters (i.e., one of the workers was an independent contractor or worked for an 
independent contractor), the employer of the negligent worker would be answerable for the 
tort to the other worker.  In this instance, a finding of non-control served the interest of 
compensation of victims.  See Delory v. Blodgett, 69 N.E. 1078 (Mass. 1904) (denying 
recovery after finding that two workers were “fellow servants” and citing other related cases); 
Delaware, L. & W. R.R. v. Hardy, 34 A. 986 (N.J. 1896) (finding no error in conclusion that 
two workers were  not “fellow servants” and upholding verdict for plaintiff); Standard Oil Co. 
v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215 (1909)(same). 
More general examination of tort law’s relationship with industry, whether performing a 
subsidy or serving other interests, is beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally Lawrence 
Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th Century, 1987 A M. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 351, 352 - 54 (schematizing the work of various scholars on this issue).  Somewhat 
categorical claims about judicial unwillingness to compensate the victims of industrial 
accident are made by, for example, FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF A MERICAN LAW, supra note 27, 
at 470 - 72; M ORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF A MERICAN LAW, 1780 - 1860 
(1977); M ORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF A MERICAN LAW, 1870 _ 1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory 
Negligence, 41 U. ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946).  Preeminent on the other side of this scholarly 
debate is Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America:  A 
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1743 (1981) (arguing that “[r]ailroad passengers were 
only rarely denied recovery on account of contributory negligence”); Gary T. Schwartz, The 
Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 641, 665 (1989) (finding the 
presence of “judicial solicitude for the victims of enterprise-occasioned accidents and a 
judicial willingness to resolve uncertainties in the law liberally in favor of those victims’ 
opportunity to secure recoveries”).  
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became dogmas of tort law, rather than novel doctrines with limited 
application, courts began following their logic in wife-passenger cases, and 
the outcomes began to shift in favor of the female accident victims.  As early 
as the 1890s,60 and overwhelmingly in the first decades of the twentieth 
century,61 courts found it no longer sufficient for defendants to argue that the 
negligence of the husband should be imputed to the wife by reason of the 
marital relation.  Using either doctrinal label—respondeat superior, or joint 
enterprise—the crucial issue for an assessment of liability was whether the 
injured car passenger had the right to control the driver.  If she did, then any 
contributory negligence of the driver would be imputed to her.  So defendants 
accused of negligently causing injury to a wife-passenger, and seeking to 
avoid liability by accusing her of contributory negligence, now had to 
contradict contemporary gender norms and argue that the wife was the 
“master” of the “servant” husband, or that they were engaged in a joint 
enterprise.  As one court summarized: 
 
The negligence of the husband is not to be imputed to the wife unless 
he is her agent in the matter in hand, or they are jointly engaged in the 
prosecution of a common enterprise.  The mere existence of the marital 
relation will not have the effect to impute the negligence of the husband 
or wife to the other.62 
 
 
                         
60See Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. v. Creek, 29 N.E. 481 (Ind. 1892) (refusing to impute 
husband’s negligence to wife); Reading Township v. Telfer, 48 P. 134 (Kan. 1897) (same); 
Finley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 74 N.W. 174, 174  (Minn. 1898) (“Plaintiff and her 
husband were not engaged in a joint enterprise, and he was not her servant or agent”; therefore 
his negligence was not imputable to her.). 
61As late as 1933, the issue was live enough for the Supreme Court to treat the rule as 
open to question.  See Miller v. Union Pac. R.R., 290 U.S. 227 (1933) (holding that 
“[w]hether a passenger or guest in a public or private conveyance, having no control over its 
movement, may be denied a right of recovery for personal injury or death on the ground of 
contributory negligence, depends upon his own failure to exercise a proper degree of care, and 
not upon that of the driver [regardless of whether] t he passenger is the wife of the driver.”).  
62Phillips v. Denver City Tramway Co., 128 P. 460, 464 (Colo. 1912). 
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Another court emphasized the role of control: 
 
Negligence on the part of a husband in driving an automobile, 
therefore, cannot be imputed to his wife, who is riding with him, unless 
the parties are engaged in an enterprise giving the wife the power and 
duty to direct or to assist in the operation and management of the car.63  
 
Doctrinally, then, there was a nearly complete reversal.  Where the rationale 
for imputing a husband’s negligence to his wife earlier had been the wife’s 
lack  of control, now that very lack of control allowed her to win her case.  
 Courts implementing these doctrinal changes described very different 
types of moral intuitions than the courts that had held women to their 
husbands’ care.  In the very earliest case I found refusing to impute a 
husband’s negligence to his wife, the court commented: 
 
In our opinion, there would be no more reason or justice in a rule that 
would, in cases of this character, inflict upon a wife the consequences 
of her husband’s negligence, solely and alone because of that 
relationship, than to hold her accountable at the bar of eternal justice 
for his sins because she was his wife.64 
 
 Success for defendants under the new doctrinal categories appears to have 
been rare, because it took unusual circumstances to create a joint enterprise.  
In a 1921 Wisconsin case, for example, the court stated: 
 
In one sense, husbands and wives in their journey through life are 
always engaged in joint enterprises, sometimes successful, sometimes 
disastrous.  But the mere fact that they travel in the same car, whether 
for pleasure or to change their abode, does not constitute a joint 
enterprise within the meaning of the rule under decision.65 
 
 
                         
63Stevens v. Luther, 180 N.W. 87, 87 (Neb. 1920). 
64Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. v. Creek, 29 N.E. 481, 482; see also THOMPSON ON 
NEGLIGENCE , supra note 21, at § 504: 
 
there is no ground in reason or justice growing out of marital relations for making a 
different rule from the one just discussed, for the case where a wife has committed 
her safety to her husband — as where she is riding in a vehicle and he is driving — 
than in any other case; and the weight of the authority is that in such a case, the 
negligence of the husband is not imputed to the wife. 
 
65Brubaker v. Iowa County, 183 N.W. 690, 692 (Wis. 1921). 
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 Although they had grown to recognize women’s individuality, courts thus 
did not alter their views of women’s limited authority.  Judges simply were 
reluctant to entertain the idea that a wife controlled her husband, or at least his 
driving.  The ideological component of such reluctance was brought out in an 
1897 Kansas case: 
 
[M]utuality or equality of direction or control does not exist in the case 
of a journey taken by husband and wife.  Say what we may in advocacy 
of the civil and political equality of the sexes, there are conditions of 
inequality between the same in other respects which the law recognizes, 
and out of which grow differing rights and liabilities. . . . By the 
universal sense of mankind, a privilege of management, a superiority of 
control, a right of mastery on such occasions is accorded to the 
husband, which forbids the idea of a co-ordinate authority, much less a 
supremacy of command in the wife.  His physical strength and 
dexterity are greater; his knowledge, judgment, and discretion assumed 
to be greater; all sentiments and instincts of manhood and chivalry 
impose upon him the obligation to care for and protect his weaker and 
confiding companion; and all these justify the assumption by him of the 
labors and responsibilities of the journey, with their accompanying 
rights of direction and control.  The special facts of cases may show the 
wife to be the controlling spirit, the active and responsible party, and 
the husband an agent, or even a mere passenger; but in cases where 
such facts are not shown the court must presume, in accordance with 
the ordinary — almost universal — experience of mankind, that the 
husband assumed and was allowed the responsible management of the 
journey.66 
 
                         
66Reading Township v. Telfer, 48 P. 134, 136 (Kan. 1897).  The law of joint enterprise is 
sometimes applied even today in automobile cas es, but with a different sense of the 
relationship between husband and wife.  See, for example, Lightner v. Frank, 727 P.2d 430 
(Kan. 1986), a wrongful death action following an accident allegedly caused by the 
defendants, a wife driving a pick-up truck with her husband as the passenger.  The court 
refused to hold the husband liable for the wife’s alleged negligence, stating, 
 
[t]he record is completely lacking in any testimony whatsoever that there was any 
agreement or understanding . . . that Dale had the right to control Jessie’s operation 
of an automobile.  In the absence of any proof of a prior agreement or understanding, 
we have no hesitancy in holding that a joint enterprise was not sufficiently 
established in the case now before us. . . .  Since [Telfer], the world has changed, and 
any assumed superiority or mastery of a husband over a wife in driving an 
automobile can no longer be recognized in Kansas law. 
 
Id. at 434. 
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Even without this kind of express substantive theory of the proper 
relationship between husband and wife, the courts sometimes simply acted 
on their perception of social reality.  In a 1923 New Hampshire case,67 the 
court held that in order for there to be a joint enterprise, and therefore to 
attribute the husband-driver’s contributory negligence to his wife-
passenger, 
 
[t]here must be not only a joint interest in the objects of purposes of the 
enterprise, but also “an equal right to direct and govern the movements 
and conduct of each other with respect thereto.” . . . In the present case 
there is no evidence that the plaintiff either had or attempted to exercise 
any authority over the manner in which her husband operated his 
automobile in which she was riding. . . .  
 
 . . . .  
 
There is in th[e] evidence not the slightest suggestion that the plaintiff 
thought she had any joint part in directing the movements of the car.  
Nor does it in any way point to the conclusion that she had such right, 
either as a matter of law or in fact.  It was the ordinary situation of the 
wife and children riding with the husband and father.  Had the 
defendant’s counsel desired to establish the existence of an unusual 
relation of the parties towards the operation of the car, it was incumbent 
upon them to inquire further. 68 
 
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court said in 1913: 
 
Common sense would dictate that, when a wife goes riding with her 
children in a rig driven by her husband, she rightfully relies on him not 
to drive so as to imperil those in his charge.  The law does not depart 
from common sense by requiring her under the circumstances shown 
here to impugn her husband’s ability to drive and assume the 
prerogative to dictate to him the manner of driving. With one child on 
her lap, and another sitting next to look after, she might with human 
and legal fairness and propriety leave the driving in the exclusive care 
of the husband and father . . . . She frankly testified that she was 
“scrooched down,” holding her baby, and “gawking around at things.”69 
 
                         
67Bowley v. Duca, 120 A. 74 (N.H. 1923). 
68Id. at 75 - 76. 
69Williams v. Withington, 129 P. 1148, 1149 - 50 (Kan. 1913). 
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Courts, then, refused to punish women-passengers for acting as gender norms 
dictated, and leaving to their husbands the responsibility for safe driving. 
 On occasion, when the husband drove a car actually owned by his wife, 
courts reversed their ordinary approach and found that her ownership of the 
car gave her sufficient authority to justify attributing his contributory 
negligence to her.70  But it was more likely in these circumstances that courts 
would avoid the conclusion that the woman was actually in charge, even if 
they had to struggle to do so.  In a 1917 Virginia case, for example, the 
defendant railroad conceded that normally a husband’s negligence is not 
imputable to the wife, but argued that because the plaintiff-wife owned the 
car, she should be bound by her husband’s negligence. 71  The court 
responded with a close look at the facts, noting that the plaintiff had sent her 
husband the car a week before the accident, for his own use in a city where he 
was working for a while.72  Though she was in the car during the accident, 
this was a coincidence, the court said.  His control (as a gratuitous bailee) was 
absolute, and hers nonexistent.73 Indeed she was not focused on the road but 
was rather 
 
talking from time to time to their guest, Stephenson.  This conduct was 
perfectly natural and such as is demanded by the ordinary rules of 
courtesy.  She had no reason to distrust her husband’s skill or 
carefulness, and notwithstanding the advances made by modern women 
towards political and economic independence of man, it still remains 
true that the normal woman married to the normal man recognizes the 
obligation of obedience contained in the marriage vow, and observes 
the Pauline injunction to remain subject to her husband.74  
 
Again, even without such explicit ideological references, the typical 
conclusion in cases where a husband drove his wife’s car was that his 
contributory negligence was not imputed to her.75 
 Cases involving accidents that occurred where a wife was driving a car 
owned by her husband-passenger underscore the gendered nature of this
                         
70See, e.g., Lucey v. Allen, 117 A. 539 (R.I. 1922) (attributing husband-driver’s 
contributory negligence to wife -passenger who owned the car, even though she did not know 
how to drive). 
71Virginia Ry. & Power v. Gorsuch, 91 S.E. 632 (Va. 1917). 
72Id. 
73Id. at 633. 
74Id. at 634. 
75See Southern Ry. v. Priester, 289 F. 945 (4th Cir. 1923) (citing, inter alia, Gorsuch, 
supra note 71); Brenner v. Goldstein, 171 N.Y.S. 579 (App. Div. 1918). 
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analysis.  A husband’s car ownership, unlike a wife’s, seems invariably to 
have ensured that any contributory negligence his wife committed would be 
imputed to him.  The fact that the wife had direct control over the wheel 
simply did not suffice to outweigh the ideological imperative of male control.  
Thus, in 1923, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s wife’s 
negligence in driving his car would be imputed to him, because he “owned the 
automobile, and was in no sense a guest of his wife, so he had control, along 
with his wife, over the movements of the car.”76  The Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky agreed, in a case in which the plaintiff, “who had been an invalid 
for some time, was riding in his automobile with his wife who was operating 
the machine.”77  The court held that her contributory negligence was 
imputable to him, because she was “his agent in the operation of his 
automobile at the time of the collision.”78  Indeed, the same rule applied 
against a husband-owner when he was not even in the car, so long as he had 
authorized its use by his wife.  For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
held in 1923 that “where a paterfamilias maintains an automobile for the 
pleasure, use and convenience of his family and . . . authorizes members of 
his family to use it for such purpose, he by so doing makes such pleasure uses 
his affair, and constitutes members of the family so operating the car his 
agents engaged in the prosecution of his affairs.” 79 
 Fleming James summarized cases in this area in two 1954 articles.  He 
commented in a footnote that “[a] possible distinction between them might 
lurk in the notion that the husband is head of the family, and so has more 
control when riding as a passenger in his own car than does the wife when 
riding in hers.”80  Although he found it an open question “[w]hether this 
notion reflects the facts of life in modern America,” he believed, as I do, that 
“its presence in the judicial mind” is suggested by holdings and language in 
some of the cases.81  It is beyond the scope of this Article to assess the 
accuracy of judicial presentation in these cases of women’s authority in 
marriage.  The relevant point is that courts throughout the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century consistently noted the fact of men’s and women’s 
inequality in marriage — but in 1890 - 1900 reversed the legal result of the 
unequal marriage in cases involving husband-drivers and wife-passengers, 
shifting the outcome from no-recovery to recovery for injured women.
                         
76Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber v. Brady, 248 S.W. 278, 280 (Ark. 1923).  
77Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky v. Thompson, 226 S.W. 368, 369 (Ky. 1920). 
78Id. at 370; see also Gochee v. Wagner, 178 N.E. 553 (N.Y.  1931) (wife-driver/husband-
owner-passenger case announcing general rule that contributory negligence of a driver is 
imputed to the owner, where owner is present in the car). 
79Stickney v. Epstein, 123 A. 1, 4 (Conn. 1923). 
80James, Vicarious Liability, supra note 57, at 213 n.260. 
81Id.; see also James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, supra note 49, at 345 n.28. 
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Overall, these wife-passenger cases demonstrate the compound nature of 
judicial inquiry into women’s status, under which agency and authority are 
separable legal and ideological concepts. 
 
 
B.  Contributory Negligence of the Female Passenger 
 
 Although the contributory negligence of a husband-driver was not 
generally imputable to his wife-passenger by 1890 - 1900, the issue of 
contributory negligence remained present.  In cases involving husbands and 
wives, and other female passengers and male drivers, juries were asked to 
evaluate the actions of the passenger to see if she had exercised ordinary care.  
This judgment too was imbued with gender-specific realities and assumptions.  
In order to recover, an injured woman had to negotiate a tricky rhetorical path.  
First she had to claim that she was not in control of the car, because that might 
suggest a joint enterprise or agency relationship and accordingly defeat 
recovery.  At the same time, if she asserted too vehemently her own lack of 
control, she ran the risk of being judged to have trusted so completely to the 
care of the man driving as to constitute contributory negligence.  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court summarized in 1916:  “If Mrs. Fogg 
trusted to the care and caution of her husband, her administrator cannot 
recover; if she did not do so, there is no evidence that she did anything for her 
own safety.  There was evidence that as she approached the crossing she was 
looking . . . in a different direction from the approaching train.”82  
Accordingly the court reversed the plaintiff’s verdict.  The same court applied 
the same rule to allow a female plaintiff to recover five years later. 83  The 
case had been tried to a judge, who returned a plaintiff’s verdict, assigning the 
blame for the accident to the defendant and the plaintiff’s husband, but 
allowing the plaintiff to recover because “she did not intrust herself in the 
care, management and operation of the automobile to her husband at the time 
of the accident.” 84 The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the judgment, 
commenting, “the judge could find that at the moment of collision the plaintiff 
was looking out for her own safety, and when faced with the emergency took
                         
82Fogg v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 111 N.E. 960, 962 (Mass. 1916).  Similarly, the 
Maine Supreme Court  denied recovery to a plaintiff in a 1904 case, holding that although a 
husband’s negligence should not be imputed to his wife, she herself was negligent because she 
should have helped him guide the wagon’s blind horse.  Whitman v. Fisher, 57 A. 895 (Me. 
1904); see also Miller v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry., 27 N.E. 339 (Ind. 1891) (plaintiff could 
not recover because “[s]he took no precautions to warn her husband, or to avert the threatened 
danger, although slight care might have avoided it”);  Southern Ry. v. Priester, 289 F. 945 (4th 
Cir. 1923). 
83McDonald v. Levenson, 131 N.E. 160 (Mass. 1921).  
84Id. at 161. 
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every precaution which the circumstances permitted.”85 The idea that a 
woman-passenger could be found contributorially negligent for “trusting to 
the care of her husband” acted as a check on the new recognition of wives’ 
agency.  In effect, a wife could forfeit her new legal claim to individuality by 
a complete failure to guard her own safety.    
 More often, however, courts in female-passenger cases featured the rule 
that “[t]he same degree of care is not required of a passenger riding in an 
automobile as is required of the driver of the car.”86  As the Supreme Court of 
Virginia said in a case involving a female passenger in a multi-passenger car-
for-hire: 
 
It is contended that some duty devolved upon [female] plaintiff [who 
rode in the rear seat of the car] to warn and guide defendant as to his 
route of travel, his speed, etc., and that neglect to discharge that duty 
constituted such contributory negligence as to defeat recovery. . . .  But 
a duty to give such advice implies a duty to heed it, and the rear seat 
driver is responsible for enough accidents as the score stands without 
the aid of judicial precedent.  The place for a passenger who knows 
better than a driver of a car, when, where, and how it should be 
operated, is at the wheel.87 
 
 Occasionally courts made explicit the precise work that gender did in such 
cases.  In an 1897 federal case involving a female passenger in a hack, the 
trial court charged the jury: 
 
I am inclined to think that, if this plaintiff were a man suing for a 
recovery, I should be constrained to advise you that he could be no 
more relieved from the duty of looking out for the train than the driver 
of the wagon; but this plaintiff being a woman, a person who is not 
accustomed, or very much accustomed, to such places, and to going in 
this fashion from one depot to another, I think it is a matter fairly for 
your consideration whether she used the care and diligence which 
should be expected of a person in her situation, in going across this 
road.88 
 
On exception being taken by the defendant, the judge amplified: 
 
 
                         
85Id. 
86Waring v. Dubuque Elec., 186 N.W. 42, 43 (Iowa 1922) (per curiam) (husband-driver, 
wife-passenger). 
87Director Gen. v. Lucas, 107 S.E. 675, 677 (Va. 1921) (quoting Hedges v. Mitchell, 194 
P. 620 (Colo. 1920)).  See also Norfolk & W. Ry. v. James, 136 S.E. 660 (Va. 1927) 
(surveying cases).  
88Denver & R. G. R.R. v. Lorentzen, 79 F. 291, 293 (C.C.D. Col. 1897). 
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I do not state that to you, gentlemen, as a matter of law or proposition 
of law, but simply as a matter for your consideration.  I want you to 
consider whether there is less diligence to be exacted or expected from 
a woman than would be expected from a man.89 
 
The appellate court found no problem in the charge, noting, 
 
Considering all that was said, it appears that the jury was left at liberty 
to determine, as it had an undoubted right to do, whether, in view of the 
plaintiff’s sex and all the surrounding circumstances, she exercised 
such care and diligence as should reasonably be expected of her.  This 
was the proper test by which to determine if she was guilty of any 
contributory fault.90 
 
 This case makes express the judicial expectation of women’s cession of 
public spaces to men, and how such expectation influenced analysis of 
contributory negligence.  A more implicit adoption of the same expectation 
underlay other courts’ analyses of contributory negligence in this context, as 
well.  For example, in a 1920 Missouri case the court wrote,  
 
How a grandmother holding a six weeks [sic] old baby in her arms, 
sitting between two other women in the rear seat of an automobile, 
owned and being operated by her husband, who had been driving a car 
for 10 or 12 years, and who she thought was a perfectly capable driver, 
as a matter of law, was guilty of contributory negligence, under the 
circumstances shown . . . in the case, we cannot understand.91 
 
And the Kansas Supreme Court held in 1916 that the wife of a driver of a car 
hit by a train was under no obligation to warn him even of obvious dangers: 
 
Why should the plaintiff have called her husband’s attention to the 
conditions and exhorted him to use due care?  She had confidence in 
his ability as a driver.  The conditions were just as obvious to him as to 
her. . . . Why ought the plaintiff to have arrogated to herself control 
over the automobile and commanded it to stop. . . .  She knew his 
ability as a driver and trusted him, and, what is more, she had the right 
to trust him.92 
                         
89Id. 
90Id. 
91Corn v. Kansas City C. C. & St. J. Ry., 228 S.W. 78, 82 (Mo. 1920). 
92Denton v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 155 P. 812, 813 (1916). Not that wives never gave 
their husbands advice about how to drive.  See, e.g., Stenstrom v. Blooston, 224 N.W. 462 
(Minn. 1929) (holding that where defendant driver would not listen even to his wife, when she 
told him to slow down, his other passengers were not contributorially negligent in failing to 
try to get him to drive more carefully). 
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Cases like these etched the gendered ideology of separate spheres and the 
masculinization of public spaces into the law of personal injury, in a way that 





C.  Normative Implications 
 
 Analysis of gender, then, played an important and unhidden role in early 
tort law’s resolution of claims involving women passengers in cars and 
wagons; ideas about women’s autonomy and authority suffused judicial 
analyses of women’s right to recover.  Moving from the descriptive and 
historical to the normative, it is tempting to give these cases a failing feminist 
grade, concluding that they implemented an anti-female ideology of women’s 
subordinate position in marriage, and, more generally, in society.93  Tempting 
but unfair.  It is true that to acknowledge women’s lesser authority and 
embody that acknowledgment in, for example, a jury instruction could be seen 
as rewarding an accident victim’s compliance with a coercive and 
subordinating hierarchy, and thus reinforcing that hierarchy.  The accusation 
has particular force for the cases that exhibited special relish in women’s 
subordinate role.94  But I think a more appropriate evaluation emphasizes that 
judicial refusal to recognize the social and ideological reality of women’s 
lesser authority would have imposed an unduly high standard of self care on 
women — a standard that would have required them to rebel against the 
gender role strictures of society.  Rather than coercing compliance with 
gender norms, recognition of women’s subordinate role simply avoided 
punishing individual accident victims for such compliance.95  Normatively 
then, in my judgment, it was appropriate for the cases discussed in this Part to
                         
93I take the basic feminist principle to be that men and women are, or should be, mora l 
and legal equals; giving content to the concept “equality” is beyond the scope of this Article.  
For discussions of theories of equality and antisubordination, see, for example, CATHARINE A. 
M ACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215 - 37 (1989); Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986); 
Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 56 - 63 (1990). 
94See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
95A rule that punished accident victims for their failure to comply with gender norms 
would be far more problematic from a normative perspective molded by modern feminism.  
This issue comes up in the train cases, discussed in Part III, when railroads alleged 
contributory negligence based on female passengers’ failure to seek help getting off a train, or 
based on male passengers’ failure to live up to norms of male agility.  See Ft. Worth & D. C. 
Ry. v. Yantis, 185 S.W. 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), discussed infra notes 171 - 173. 
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II.  WOMEN DRIVERS 
 
 Although women were mostly passengers, they were also occasionally 
drivers.96  When women did drive, they sometimes were injured in accidents.  
In the late nineteenth century, resulting court opinions occasionally discussed 
gender, expressing a shared sense that women were not as capable drivers as 
men.  However, the time span in which cases involving women drivers 
actually discussed gender was brief.  By the early twentieth century, and the 
replacement of the horse-drawn wagon by the automobile, evidence of 
judicial consideration of gender difference in this area seems to have all but 
disappeared.   Whether women drove cars or horse-drawn vehicles, courts in 
the twentieth century generally did not discuss the drivers’ gender as bearing 
on an assessment of liability.    
 In the earlier cases, a range of doctrinal options existed for a court 
confronting an accident involving a female driver and a claim that gender 
difference was relevant:  women might be bound to take more care to 
compensate for their lack of skill; women might be held to commit 
contributory negligence simply by driving; women might be held to a 
standard of care that referenced only other women drivers (in practice, then, 
their perceived lesser skill could excuse what otherwise might be contributory 
negligence), or to a male standard of care, or to a bi-gender standard of care; 
defendants might be required to take more care to accommodate women’s 
needs as drivers.  There are cases weighing each of these options, but no one 
approach appears to have prevailed.   These cases demonstrate that even 
where courts share a view that women’s abilities are not as developed as 
men’s, gender politics can intertwine with doctrine in complex ways that 
produce very disparate approaches. 
 An 1860 Connecticut case provides an early example of the assumption 
that women were bad drivers, and how that assumption could operate within a 
personal injury case.  In Fox v. Town of Glastenbury,97 the estate of Harriet 
Fox sued the town, arguing that the accident in which she died was caused by 
the town’s failure to maintain a railing along the sides of a causeway.98  The 
jury had rendered a plaintiff’s verdict, but the state supreme court vacated and 
                         
96See SCHARFF, supra note 30, at 17.   
9729 Conn. 204 (1860). 
98As the facts of the cases presented in Parts I and II illustrate, in the days before highway 
driving, personal injury cases involving harm to car or wagon drivers and passengers tended to 
be of three types: suits against railroads arising out of car/train collisions; suits against the 
town or county responsible for maintaining a road, alleging that a hazardous road condition 
had caused an accident; and two or more car collisions. 
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remanded for a new trial, holding that while the town’s failure to maintain a 
railing along the causeway was in fact negligence, Fox’s attempt to make the 
passage across the causeway was contributory negligence.  The court stated 
that “[w]e think no person of ordinary discretion in their circumstances, and 
exercising ordinary prudence and discretion, would have made such 
attempt.”99  This is a typical, linguistically gender-neutral standard of care, 
apparently unexceptionable from a feminist perspective.  But the court 
continued: 
 
We are not unmindful of the fact urged upon our attention by the 
plaintiff’s counsel, that these travelers were females. And in that fact, 
and in the timidity, inexperience, and want of skill which it implies, we 
can find an explanation of their injudicious and fatal attempt to turn 
around in the water, but no reason or excuse for the recklessness of 
their conduct in driving into it. . . . [T]heir error was in rushing into 
dangers which they had but too much reason to expect, and ought to 
have anticipated and avoided.100 
 
The court concluded, “if men of ordinary prudence and discretion would 
regard the ability of the party inadequate for the purpose without hazard or 
danger, the risk should not be assumed.”101  
 It seems that in Fox the reviewing court merged together two questions:  
What would a reasonable person do? and, What would a reasonable man 
expect the plaintiff to do?  The opinion’s “men of ordinary prudence and 
discretion” function not as models setting the standard for accident-avoidance, 
but as jury/blame-assessors.102  Thus, members of the all-male jury are 
excused from deciding whether they themselves would have crossed the 
causeway.  They are told instead, to recall that women are bad drivers, and 
decide whether a woman driver should have crossed.  To neglect to consider 
gender as a factor counting against the plaintiff is deemed inappropriate. 
 Other courts, however, took a different approach.  In Daniels v. Clegg,103 
in 1873, as in Fox, the court believed that female sex equated to lack of skill 
in driving, but announced that femaleness could excuse lack of skill.  Richard 
Clegg sued Calvin Daniels to recover the damage to his horse and buggy 
when Daniels collided with Clegg’s daughter, who was driving.  She was 
twenty years old and was driving quite fast, downhill, “being in great haste to 
                         
9929 Conn. 204 at 208. 
100Id. 
101Id. at 208 - 09. 
102Id. at 208. 
10328 Mich. 32 (1873) (Christiancy, C.J). 
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find her father on account of the dangerous illness of a sister.”104  After a jury 
verdict for Clegg, Daniels appealed, contesting several of the charges to the 
jury.  The court had charged the jury that: 
 
in deciding whether the plaintiff’s daughter exercised ordinary care in 
driving the horse, or was guilty of [contributory] negligence, the jury 
should consider the age of the daughter, and the fact that she was a 
woman . . . . [S]he would not be guilty of negligence if she used that 
degree of care that a person of her age and sex would ordinarily use.105 
 
The trial judge refused the defendant’s requested instruction that “for the 
purpose of this case, the daughter should be held to the same degree of care 
and skill that would be required of the plaintiff [her father] himself, had he 
been driving at the time of the collision.”106 
 Chief Justice Christiancy of the Michigan Supreme Court approved the 
charge as ultimately given, commenting: 
 
No one would ordinarily expect, and the defendant had no right to 
expect, from a young woman thus situated, the same amount of 
knowledge, skill, dexterity, steadiness of nerve, or coolness of 
judgment, in short the same degree of competency, which he would 
expect of ordinary men under like circumstances; nor, consequently, 
would it be just to hold her to the same high degree of care and skill.  
The incompetency indicated by her age or sex,—without evidence (of 
which there is none) of any unusual skill or experience on her part,—
was less in degree, it is true, than in the case of a mere child; but the 
difference is in degree only, and not in principle.107  
                         
104Id. at 34. 
105Id. at 40. 
106Id. 
107Id. at 42.  The court explicitly distinguished an earlier case, also written by Chief 
Justice Christiancy.  In Lake Shore & M. S. R.R. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274 (1872), Mary Miller 
sued the railroad company over the injuries she received when a train hit a wagon in which 
she was riding.  The wagon was d riven by its owner, a man named Eldridge. The trial court 
had given as one of many instructions, a charge that said that Eldridge and Miller could not 
recover unless they had used “such care as persons of their situation or condition in life, 
would ordinarily exert under like circumstances . . . . [A]ny greater care than this she was not 
required to exercise.”  Id. at 281.  The Michigan Supreme Court strongly disagreed, asking: 
 
How are railroad companies, or their engineers o r employes, to know the personal 
peculiarities, the infirmities, personal character or station in life, of the hundreds of 
persons crossing or approaching their track? . . . And if they do not know, then how 
and why shall the company be required to run their road, or regulate their own 
conduct, or that of their servants, by such personal peculiarities of strangers, of 
which they know nothing? These questions suggest their own answers. 
 
Id. at 280.  This case does not on its face seem to be about gender at all.  Nonetheless, Chief 
Justice Christiancy himself must have thought that gender was implicated in Miller, or there 
would have been no need to distinguish it in Daniels v. Clegg. 
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Again, the injured female, at age twenty, a legal minor, is like a child; but this 
time she wins her suit rather than loses by that fact. 
Tort law could have responded to perceptions of feminine incompetence 
with an onerous doctrinal rule that women committed contributory negligence 
as a matter of law simply by driving.  This would have been enforcement of 
separate spheres ideology with a vengeance.  But I was able to find just one 
case where such an approach was even urged.  In Cobb v. Standish,108 a Maine 
case decided in 1837, well before any other case my research for this Article 
uncovered, the plaintiff-husband sought damages for the death of a wagon-
horse, which died after falling into a mud pit that looked like a watering hole 
by the side of the road.  The plaintiff’s wife had been driving the wagon, and 
the defendant town argued that “trusting a horse to be driven by a woman was 
conclusive evidence of want of ordinary care, which would go to excuse the 
defendants.”109  The trial judge overruled the objection, and instructed the 
jury, 
 
that they should determine upon the evidence, in connection with their 
knowledge of the common practice in the country of trusting women to 
drive horses, whether they were satisfied, that the plaintiff in thus 
trusting his wife with the care of his horse had conducted with that 
want of ordinary care, which would go to excuse the defendants.110 
 
The appellate court upheld this instruction, and the plaintiff’s verdict, 
commenting, “There is no doubt but a woman may be permitted to drive a 
well broken horse, without any violation of common prudence.”111 
 And other cases refused more expansively to accept any notion that 
women and men made up different communities of drivers, whose conduct 
tort law should acknowledge as categorically different.  In Tucker v. 
Henniker,112 the New Hampshire Supreme Court insisted that women were 
part of a bi-gender community of drivers by reference to which the ordinary 
standard of care was set.  The plaintiff, injured while driving a horse and 
carriage, sued the town, arguing that defects in the repair of the road caused
                         
10814 Me. 198 (1837). 
109Id. at 199. 
110Id. 
111Id. at 200. 
11241 N.H. 317 (1860). 
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her accident.  The town, in turn, argued that she had been contributorially 
negligent.  In the trial court, the jury had been instructed that the plaintiff was 
“bound to exercise ordinary care, skill and prudence in managing [her] horse, 
such care, skill and prudence as ordinary persons like herself were 
accustomed to exercise in managing their horses.”113 
 The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the plaintiff’s verdict and 
remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury might have been misled into 
thinking from the phrase “ordinary persons like herself” that the plaintiff was 
to be held to a standard of care set by comparison to women, rather than the 
entire community.  The court explained: 
 
In a country where women are accustomed, as among us, to drive 
horses and carriages, there can be no doubt that the degree of care, skill 
and prudence required of a woman in managing her horse would be 
precisely that degree of care, skill and prudence which persons of 
common prudence, or mankind in general, usually exercise, or are 
accustomed to exert, in the management of the horses driven by them.  
Now the language of the charge in the court below might be construed 
as making the average care, skill and prudence of women in managing 
horses, instead of the average care, skill and prudence of mankind 
generally, including all those accustomed to manage horses, whether 
men or women, boys or girls, the standard by which to determine 
whether or not the plaintiff had been guilty of any unskillfulness or 
want of care in the management of her horse at the time of the accident.  
As it may be doubtful whether this average would be higher or lower 
than that of mankind in general, and as it is not the precise standard 
prescribed by the law, and the jury may possibly have been misled by 
it, the instructions must be held to have been erroneous on this point.114  
                         
113Id. at 319. 
114Id. at 321 - 22. Compare City of Bloomington v. Perdue, 99 Ill. 329 (1881), in which 
the court upheld a jury verdict for a female pedestrian injured because of an unsafe sidewalk, 
over defendants’ claim that the trial court’s instructions tended to make the standard of care 
for the plaintiff “what ordinary young ladies would do.”  Id. at 333.  The court replied that the 
standard of care charged had been the conduct of “an ordinarily prudent person,” and of “a 
woman of common or ordinary prudence,” and upheld the verdict.  Id.  That is, the court 
emphasized that not gender but prudence was at issue; a trial court’s use of the feminine in a 
charge did not overwhelm what the Supreme Court considered the ungendered sense of the 
charge.  By negative implication, the reviewing court  thus indicated that had gender been 
emphasized sufficiently to compel a conclusion that the jury was instructed to apply a 
“prudent woman” standard, the charge would have been legally erroneous.   
The appellate analysis in both Tucker and City of Bloomington underscores the 
ambiguousness of the language of gender, highlighting that the words “person,” “man,” and 
“woman,” have multiple meanings.  In Tucker, the court could have construed use of the word 
“person” to indicate to the jury that the p laintiff’s sex was irrelevant.  Instead, the court thought 
that the word person, in the phrase “person like herself,” served not to connote gender 
neutrality, but as a placeholder for gender to be filled in, conceptually, according to the sex of 
the plaintiff.  Conversely, in City of Bloomington, the court read the word “woman” not to 
mean that femaleness was relevant, but simply to indicate that the relevant actor was female, 
though her gender did not matter.  The word “man,” too, has multiple meanings.  Man can 
mean that maleness is relevant, or that the relevant actor is male, though it doesn’t matter; man 
can even, especially in older times, be intended to include women.  See Eichorn v. Missouri, K. 
& T. Ry., 32 S.W. 993 (Mo. 1895), discussed infra notes  226 - 232 and accompanying text. 
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Although the court in Tucker purported to be imposing a strict rule of 
gender neutrality, it seems unlikely that a similar reference to “ordinary 
persons like himself” would have seemed erroneously gender-specific to the 
court.  Like those in other jurisdictions, New Hampshire courts commonly 
used masculine language in tort cases, referring, for example, to “men of 
ordinary care and prudence.”115  And while the Tucker court claimed “doubt” 
as to whether prudent women were more or less careful than prudent men, the 
court must have believed it at least likely that the comparison benefited the 
plaintiff, not the defendant, because it reversed a plaintiff’s verdict.  
Gender also could enter the analysis when courts assessed the duty of a 
defendant towards a female driver.  For example, in a 1906 California case, 
the appellate court upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiff, who was injured 
when the buggy she was riding in hit a train.  The buggy was driven by her 
sister-in-law.  The court held the jury justified in finding the railroad 
negligent, when its engineer failed to stop or even slow the train for some time 
after he “saw that the driver (a woman) could not manage the horse.”116   The 
idea that those operating cars or trains should pay extra care when 
approaching women driving horse-led vehicles was apparently widespread.  
For example, a 1911 Minnesota statute required car drivers passing anyone 
with a horse to stop if requested or signaled, and to cut the motor if the horse 
appeared “badly frightened” or upon request.117  The statute imposed even 
greater duties on car drivers “upon meeting or overtaking any horse, or other 
draft animal, driven or in charge of a woman, child or aged person.”118  In 
those circumstances, the driver was required to slow the speed of the car to 
four miles per hour, and to stop the car, even without request, if the draft 
animal exhibited “any signs of fright.”119 
                         
115Cofran v. Sanbornton, 56 N.H. 12, 13 (1875) (Smith, J.); see also, e.g. Gordon v. 
Boston & M. R.R., 58 N.H. 396, 397 (1878) (referencing “men of ordinary skill, prudence, 
and diligence” in jury charge).   
116Johnson v. Center, 88 P. 727, 728 (Cal. App. 1906).  
117Act of April 20, 1911, ch. 365, § 13, 1911 Minn. Laws 498.   
118Act of April 20, 1911, ch. 365, § 15, 1911 Minn. Laws 499. 
119Id.  
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Although the law just discussed offered these varied analyses of gender’s 
impact in women-drivers cases, judges in such cases did not invariably 
address gender at all.  This was probably not because late-nineteenth century 
courts failed to consider the possibility of discussing gender in these 
circumstances.  The cases discussed above were well known and frequently 
listed in treatises,120 so the gender issues they raised were familiar to 
contemporaries.  However, the cases’ analyses of gender were rarely cited in 
other opinions.  For example, Daniels was a well known case, cited by courts 
around the country over thirty times, according to Shepard’s Citations.  
Though it was sometimes cited by early tort treatises121 and frequently offered 
by modern scholars122 to substantiate their point that women were treated as 
childlike by the common law, Daniels was not, in fact, relied on for that 
proposition by contemporary courts.123  Daniels was cited frequently by courts 
for its rule relating to the contributory negligence of children — that the jury 
should take into account their age and sex — but only once for the proposition 
that women should be expected to have less driving skill than men.124 
                         
120See, e.g., CHARLES FISK BEACH ,  JR. ,  A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE  § 260, 391 (John J. Crawford ed., 3d ed. 1899); 1 THOMPSON ON NEGLIGENCE , 
supra note 21, at § 339, 319 - 20. 
121See, e.g., sources cited supra note 120. 
122See, e.g., Collins, supra note 12, at 316 - 17; Forell, Essentialism, supra note 15, at 775 
n.32. 
123See Winter v. Harris, 49 A. 398, 399 (R.I. 1901).  Winter discussed an accident 
involving a buggy driven by the female plaintiff.  Even though it cited, and therefore had 
demonstrably read Daniels, the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not discuss gender in its 
opinion. 
124See Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Hassenyer, 12 N.W. 155, 157 (Mich. 1882) (Cooley, J.), a 
case involving a (minor) female pedestrian killed by a train that cited Daniels for its gender-
related rule.  In Hassenyer , the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff because the jury had been charged that the law did not require the same degree of 
care and prudence in a woman as in a man.  If anything, Justice Cooley commented, the 
opposite ought to be the rule:  
 
if we judge of ordinary care by the standard of what is commonly looked for and 
expected, we should  probably agree that a woman would be likely to be more 
prudent, careful and particular in many positions and in the performance of many 
duties than a man would. . . . In many . . . cases a woman’s natural timidity and 
inexperience with dangers inclines her to be more cautious; and if we naturally and 
reasonably look for greater caution in the woman than in the man, any rule of law 
that demands less must be unphilosophical and unreasonable. 
 
Id. at 157.  Justice Cooley noted that use of the word “woman” did  not invariably signify 
judicial intent to instruct the jury that gender difference might be relevant:  “[W]hen the actor is 
a woman, an instruction that she is bound to observe the conduct of a woman of common and 
ordinary prudence, cannot be held legally  erroneous because of being thus special.”  Id.  But he 
cautioned that “the legal requirement is only the observance of ordinary care; and . . . in laying 
down rules that are of general application, it is no doubt better to employ general terms, lest 
they be supposed applicable to particular classes only.”  Id.  The linguistic possibilities of 
gender-specific and gender-neutral language are discussed briefly supra note 114.  As with 
Daniels, treatises, but not caselaw, cited Hassenyer  for its treatment of gender. 
 It is interesting to note that Justice Cooley was quicker in other circumstances to allow 
judicial recognition of gender difference.  See Cartwright v. Chicago & G.T. Ry., 18 N.W. 380, 
381 (Mich. 1886) (Cooley, C.J.) (upholding plaintiff’s jury verdict where female passenger was 
injured getting out of the train at the rear, rather than the front; “[W]e think a woman is 
excusable for not desiring to pass through the smoking car, and she has a right to assume it is 
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Similarly, courts frequently cited Tucker v. Henniker for other propositions, 
but rarely for its analysis of gender.125  Perhaps the courts that did not discuss 
gender in these circumstances believed women to be as capable as men at 
driving, or perhaps they believed any incapability inappropriately recognized 
by the tort system, or perhaps they thought the issue not properly raised 
without proffered evidence.  There is no way to know.    
Moreover, as the twentieth century progressed, judges deciding woman-
driver cases stopped addressing gender, whether the woman was driving a car 
or a horse-drawn vehicle.126   Again, and for the same reasons, I think it likely 
that this was not a case of unconscious erasure of gender, but rather a decision 
not to include it expressly in the analysis. To add to the speculations proposed 
above, it may be that although the assumption of lesser feminine competence 
lasted well into the modern era, that assumption had carried particular weight 
for women driving horse-drawn vehicles.127  Or perhaps the factual predicate 
of the cases became less frequent because many fewer women drove early 
cars, which were difficult and dirty to start,128 than had driven horse-drawn 
vehicles.  Whatever the reason, I found just one case involving a woman 
automobile driver that expressly addressed gender after 1906, a 1923 New
                                                           
not expected of her.”). 
125See, e.g., Winship v. Enfield, 42 N.H. 197, 213 (1860); Clifford v. Tyman, 61 N.H. 508 
(1881).  Both cases cite Tucker  only for propositions unrelated to gender, though both involve 
female drivers. 
126I was able to uncover the following late 19th- and early 20th-century cases dealing with 
accidents involving women drivers of both cars and horse-drawn vehicles, in which the 
reported opinion did not mention gender:  McCray v. Sharpe, 66 So. 441 (Ala. 1914) (female 
driver of buggy sues male car driver); Finkle v. Tait, 203 P. 1031 (Cal. App. 1921); Golden 
Eagle Dry Goods v. Mockbee, 189 P. 850 (Colo. 1920); St. Mary’s Academy of Sisters of 
Loretto of City of Denver v. Newhagen, 238 P. 21 (Colo. 1925); Opp v. Pryor, 128 N.E. 580 
(Ill. 1920); Tisdale v. Town of Bridgewater, 45 N.E. 730 (Mass. 1897); Carson v. Turrish, 168 
N.W. 349 (Minn. 1918); Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry., 69 N.W. 900 (Minn. 1897); Carero v. 
Breslin, 128 A. 883 (N.J. 1925) (two-car collision involving two women drivers); Peters v. 
Cuneo, 108 N.Y.S. 264 (App. Div. 1908); Williams v. Board of Trustees, 205 N.Y.S. 742 
(App. Div. 1924) (female driver of horse-drawn school wagon “capable of doing a man’s 
work”); Winter v. Harris, 49 A. 398, 399 (R.I. 1901).  In addition, in none of the cases 
discussed above at text accompanying notes -, dealing with women driving their husbands’ 
cars, do courts talk about any impact of gender on the standard of care for the driver.   
127See Michael Berger, Women Drivers:  The Emergence of Folklore and Stereotypic 
Opinion Concerning Feminine Automotive Behavior, 9 W OMEN’S STUD.  INT’L FORUM 257, 
258 (1986)(arguing that stereotype of women as bad drivers did not emerge until twenty or 
thirty years after invention of the automobile). 
128SCHARFF, supra note 30, at 15. 
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York case brought by a husband for the wrongful death of his wife in a car 
accident caused by negligent upkeep of the roads.  A New York appellate 
court commented that the husband “is entitled to have reasonable care 
bestowed upon the road his wife has to travel — a care which has in view the 
fact that women and young persons have not that ability to recover themselves 
from dangerous situations that seasoned drivers or resourceful men may 
have.”129 
Where courts did choose to address gender, the range of approaches taken 
in the women drivers cases shows, again, that to know that courts considered 
gender important in a certain context — even when the reason gender was at 
issue was somewhat disrespectful of women’s equality, like an assumption 
that women are bad drivers — is to know very little.  When women were 
injured while they were driving, the category of cases was small enough, and 
the doctrinal possibilities wide enough, that the opinions do not yield a 
definitive approach.  Rather, the cases highlight the pressure points of tort 
doctrine’s interaction with gender, and reveal that those pressure points are 
not modern inventions. 
 
 
III.  TRAIN CASES 
 
The largest constellation of early personal injury cases in which gender 
appears, in text and subtext, arose when women passengers of trains and 
streetcars were injured, usually boarding or disembarking.  The cases’ 
preoccupation with gender arises out of several obvious sources of gender 
difference relevant to passengers’ ability to avoid accidents.  First and 
foremost was clothing.  During the time examined, women’s physical agility 
was impaired by long skirts, corsets,130 and, often, high heels.131  In addition, 
between 1850 and 1925, roughly the period here examined, the country had a 
far higher birth rate than today;132 women, that is, were pregnant far more of
                         
129Roberts v. Town of Eaton, 202 N.Y.S. 360, 362 (App. Div. 1923). 
130See LEE HALL,  COMMON THREADS:  A  PARADE OF A MERICAN CLOTHING 203 (1992) 
(reporting that during the first decades of the 20th century, women still wore corsets, dragging 
skirts, and other encumbering clothes); Helene E. Roberts, The Exquisite Slave:  The Role of 
Clothes in the Making of the Victorian Woman, 2 SIGNS 554, 557 - 58 (1977) (cataloging 
fashions and their restrictions on women’s mobility through the nineteenth century); Welke, 
Unreasonable Women, supra note 15, at 380 & nn.31 - 34 (citing these and other sources).  
Skirts imposed risks in contexts other than railroad travel, of course.  See, e.g., Hensler v. Stix, 
88 S.W. 108 (Mo. 1905) (discussing the injuries that resulted when a young woman’s skirt 
was caught in an elevator door). 
131Heels contributed to many accidents involving women. See, e.g., Central of Georgia 
Ry. v. Carlisle, 56 So. 737, 739 (Ala. Ct. App. 1911) (per curiam) (describing plaintiff’s 
footwear as “new Sunday shoes, with heels that tapered a good d eal down to a point”); 
Arkansas Midland Ry. v. Robinson, 130 S.W. 536 (Ark. 1910); Wisdom v. Chicago, R.I. & G. 
Ry., 231 S.W. 344, 345 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921) (plaintiff was wearing “pumps, of a 
fashionable make, with heels about three inches high”). 
132UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 49, Series B5 - 10 (1976). 
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the time than they are now, which created additional risks.133  Furthermore, 
Americans in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a strong sense 
of the fragility of female reproductive health.134  Certainly part of this sense 
was based on hard facts, given how little was known about medicine.  In any 
event, even a constructed sense of fragility must have had real effects on real 
women and the ways they learned to behave.   
Women’s somewhat constrained mobility was important since trains and 
streetcars were difficult to board and disembark.135  Getting on or off required 
stepping up anywhere from fourteen or eighteen inches to three or three-and-
a-half-feet — a long way, up or down.136  In a long skirt, often with a train 
trailing down to the floor, stepping all that way caused frequent falls — the 
clothes were confining,137 a woman might step on her own skirt, or someone 
else might step on her, or the skirt might catch on a part of the car.138  In 
addition, small children could not manage the step on their own and had to be
                         
133See West v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 86 S.W. 140 (Mo. 1905) (“The court instructs the jury 
as a matter of law that it is dangerous and unsafe for a lady in a state of pregnancy to jump, 
either by assistance or alone, from the end of a flat car, a distance of four or five feet, onto a 
hard surface.”); Brodie v. Carolina Midland Ry., 24 S.E. 180 (S.C. 1896) (regarding a plaintiff 
who suffered a miscarriage after jumping two-and-a-half to three feet from train step to 
ground). 
134The non-judicial sources are countless.  In the legal realm, see, most famously, Muller 
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (“That woman’s physical structure and the performance 
of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious.  
This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her.”).  In the specific arena 
of boarding and disembarking injuries, see, for example, Steketee v. Waters, 159 N.W. 368, 
369 (Mich. 1916) (plaintiff had been operated on for “female trouble” and when she was 
pulled off a high train step, the operation came undone); Warden v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 35 Mo. 
App. 631, 632 (1889) (plaintiff suffered a “uterine hemorrhage” after walking in a  bad storm 
when the defendant railroad let her off past her station); Madden v. Port Royal & W. C. Ry., 
14 S.E. 713, 713 (S.C. 1892) (plaintiff in delicate health suffered “displacement of her womb” 
after jumping from last step on train to ground); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. of Tex. v. Morgan, 108 
S.W. 724, 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) (plaintiff was suffering from “womb trouble or womb 
disease,” for which she had been recently treated, and suffered a relapse when she was carried 
past her station and was forced to stay overnight and walk and ride in the rain to get home). 
135In Judge Posner’s sample of 19th-century tort cases, seven percent of all cases appear 
to have been predicated on injuries to train and streetcar passengers boarding and 
disembarking.  See Posner, supra note 2, at 53 (table 2) (finding that out of 1528 total cases, 
65 involved non-collision railroad passenger accidents), 54 (table 3) (identifying 45 cases  
involving streetcar passengers injured boarding or disembarking). 
136See, e.g., Toledo, St. L. & K. C. Ry. v. Wingate, 37 N.E. 274, 275 (Ind. 1894) (26 
inches from top of platform to lower steps of train); Hager v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 104 A. 
599, 599 (Pa. 1918) (three feet from the ground to the train); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Watson, 10 
S.W. 731, 731 (Tex. 1889) (30 - 36 inches from the ground to the first step onto the train); San 
Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Wiuvar, 257 S.W. 667, 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (14 - 20 inches 
from the ground to the train). 
137See Foy v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 144 Eng. Rep. 429, 430 (C.P. 1865) (discussing 
restrictions on movement imposed by women’s clothing). 
138See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Hayne, 95 So. 879, 880 (Ala. 1923) (plaintiff’s dress caught 
on something as she boarded the train); Citizens’ St. Ry. v. Shepherd, 62 N.E. 300, 300 (Ind. 
App. 1901) (someone stepped on plaintiff’s skirt); Dorcey v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light, 
203 N.W. 327, 328 (Wis. 1925) (same). 
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carried, often by their mothers.139  Perhaps as important as the length of the 
step were the social customs involved.  It was quite normal during the time 
here examined for passengers to get on a train or streetcar while it was moving 
slowly.140  Sometimes trains or streetcars did not even come to rest at a stop; 
they would just slow down and passengers would jump on or off. 141 The 
problem for women was that their manner of dress meant that jumping on or 
off a train was quite likely to cause injury.  
In general, then, women and men were not equally at ease in all the steps 
involved in getting on and off trains and streetcars.  No wonder, then, that 
gender is a prevalent topic in the cases about train-passenger injuries to 
women, in which plaintiffs often sought damages for carriers’ creation of risks 
that affected women more than men.  This Part analyzes the results, as courts 
grappled with distinguishing equal from special treatment—a line that 
continues to trouble legal decisionmakers. 
The cases display a crucial tension.  First, courts all-but-universally 
agreed that railroads had to go to some lengths to accommodate women’s 
physical needs, because accommodation was necessary for women’s access to 
mass transportation.  Consideration of a female accident victim’s sex could 
help her prove a case of negligence because she could argue that the railroad’s 
failure to make a particular accommodation was unreasonable, given that 
many passengers were female.142  At the same time, courts seemed to have
                         
139See, e.g., Johnson v. Mahoning & S. Ry. & Light, 60 Pa. Super. 530, 535 (1915) 
(plaintiff injured when she fell disembarking from the streetcar with a child in her arms; “[t]he 
common and well-known practice of mothers in so acting is an answer to defendant’s” claim 
of contributory negligence). 
140See, e.g., Paducah Traction v. Tolar, 171 S.W. 1009, 1011 (Ky. 1915) (“It is true that it 
is quite a common and usual thing for passengers to leave [street]cars before they stop and to 
get on them before they stop . . . . [but] while the conductor, in the exercise of ordinary care, 
might not be required to take notice of the action of a passenger able to take care of himself in 
alighting from a car running at a slow rate of speed, it is perfectly obvious that, when a 
conductor sees a middle -aged woman in the act of getting off a car running at 10 or 15 miles 
an hour, he cannot help but know that it is a most unusual and uncommon thing to do, as well 
as extremely dangerous . . . .”); Johnson v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power, 128 S.W. 
243, 244 (Mo. App. 1910) (discussing ordinance requiring streetcar conductors to stop their 
cars as women or children leave or enter, as effecting change from common law rule); Filer v. 
N.Y. Cent. Ry., 49 N.Y. 47, 48 (1872) (plaintiff injured as she exited a slowly moving train 
after the conductor refused her request that it stop). 
141See 2 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE  § 520, 954 - 61 (5th ed. 1898). 
142In requiring accommodation of women’s reasonable needs, even where such needs 
were different from men’s, the announced rule in this area is somewhat analogous to the 
“reasonable woman” standard some propose for modern sexual harassment law.  See, e.g., 
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 
611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal 
Language:  The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
1398 (1992); George Rutherglen, Sexual Harassment: Ideology or Law?, 18 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 487, 495 - 98 (1995); Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability 
for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 PENN. L. REV. 1461, 1486 - 88 (1986). 
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considered it important that accommodation did not slip over an ill-defined 
line into special treatment.  This reluctance was premised, at least in part, on 
judicial recognition that women possessed the complete adult capacity to take 
risks and bear the consequences.  So, for example, courts found that it would 
have been inappropriate to expect railroad personnel to render unsought 
assistance in too large a variety of circumstances:  requiring railroad 
employees to assume that women needed help, even when they did not ask for 
it, would have been onerous for the railroads and treated women as less than 
full adults.  Courts did not even consider treating women as not responsible 
enough to merit an inquiry into contributory negligence.  Moreover, in 
assessing the railroad’s claim of contributory negligence, gender difference 
could cut against the plaintiff.  Given the difference in women’s and men’s 
abilities to negotiate obstacles, just as plaintiffs were entitled to have the jury 
instructed to take account of the accident victim’s sex in their determination of 
whether the railroad was negligent, the same rule applied against women 
seeking damages;  the defendant generally could insist that the jury be 
informed that it might consider a plaintiff’s age, sex, and physical condition in 
determining whether that passenger took an untoward risk.  
This Article is not the first to examine these railroad cases.  Barbara 
Welke has previously discussed many of the cases I analyze in this Part.143  
Welke, however, reaches very different conclusions.  She finds that “gender, 
in the context of accidental personal injury, often freed women from 
responsibility for their acknowledged disabilities and imposed responsibility 
for taking account of those deficiencies on men (the defendants).”144  But, 
Welke argues, the social construction of difference as disability remained.  
Even if female tort plaintiffs did not bear the full brunt of their difference in 
their individual cases, the presentation of difference itself was oppressive: 
“[t]he judgments reached in cases involving women were predicated on a 
consistent, uniform, and debilitating picture of women.”145  In sum, “imposing 
the obligation of taking account of women’s disabilities on defendants” meant 
that “[w]omen are incapable of taking care of themselves, therefore men must 
do so.”146   
As presented below, I disagree with Welke’s reading of the cases, though 
I certainly profited from her research and discussion.  I find the cases 
characterized by their refusal either to exclude or to infantilize women.  In my
                         
143Welke, Unreasonable Women, supra note 15. 
144Id. at 402. 
145Id. at 400. 
146Id. at 402. 
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view, the cases recognized certain differences between men and women, but 
did not cast women’s difference as a disability.  Far from oppressively 
enforcing the assigned feminine character of timidity and weakness, courts 
engaged in a quite sensitive and empathetic account of female experience, and 
through the lens of common carrier doctrine, used that account in assessing 
liability and the right to recover. 
 
 
A.  Duties of the Carriers 
 
1.  Common Carrier Doctrine 
 
 As common carriers, railroads and streetcars were obligated to serve 
everyone capable of self-care.147  The principle of common carriage is ancient, 
though scholars disagree about its earliest rationale.148  The earliest of 
American civil rights statutes, the 1875 Civil Rights Act, was an attempt to 
codify a version of the law of common carriage by requiring not just access, 
but access under conditions that did not discriminate on account of race.149  
No such statute was passed or needed relating to service for (white) women.  
For example, the common law and custom sufficed to induce railroads not 
simply to offer accommodation, but accommodation that respected women’s 
desire for a decorous and respectable passenger compartment.150 
                         
147A frequently stated rule was that a carrier need not take on a passenger who “because 
of extreme youth or old age, or any mental or physical infirmities, is unable to take care of 
himself,” unless that passenger brought along “an attendant to take care of him.”  Croom v. 
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 53 N.W. 1128, 1129 (Minn. 1893); see also Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. 
v. Sears, 210 S.W. 684, 685 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1919) (“A carrier is not required to accept as 
a passenger one without an attendant who is mentally incapable of caring for himself.”). 
148See Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude:  Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (surveying cases and scholarly analyses of 
justification of common carrier doctrine, and finding scholarly disagreement).  The status of 
common carrier brought with it other obligations and liabilities, as well.  For example, the 
common carrier was liable for damage to goods it carried, unless the damage was caused by 
an act of God.  See Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703); see also Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., Common Carriers and the Common Law, 13 A MER. L. REV. 609 (1879) (tracing 
common law development of the rule).  
149The statute, was, of course, overturned by the Supreme Court in The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), as beyond the authority of Congress. 
150See, e.g., Nieto v. Clark, 18 F. Cas. 236, 238 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (“In respect to 
female passengers, the contract [of common carriage] . . . includes an implied stipulation that 
they shall be protected against obscene conduct, lascivious behavior, and every immodest and 
libidinous approach.”); Craker v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 36 Wis. 657, 674 (1875) (“Every 
woman has a right to assume that a passenger car is not a brothel; and that when she travels in 
it, she will meet nothing, see nothing, hear nothing, to wound her delicacy or insult her 
womanhood.”).  This rule protected African American as well as white women. Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. v. Finn, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 57, 59 (1894) (upholding jury verdict for black 
plaintiff who was assaulted by two white male passengers; “as to female passengers, . . . their 
contract of passage embraces an implied stip ulation that the company will protect them 
against general obscenity, immodest conduct or wanton approach”).  Railroads typically 
designated a car for “ladies,” usually including their male escorts.  See, e.g, Peck v. N.Y. Cent. 
& H. R. R.R., 70 N.Y. 587 (1877).  Ladies cars were sometimes available to both black and 
white women, but by the 1880s and 1890s, in the South, such cars were usually reserved for 
white women.  See Minter, supra note 26; Welke, Road to Plessy, supra note 26. 
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 It was the principle  of common carriage that dictated that railroads were 
legally required to meet women’s reasonable needs, as much as men’s, in both 
trains and stations.  A typical statement of this requirement was offered by a 
Missouri judge in 1915: 
 
A railroad company does not exercise its franchise as a common 
carrier of passengers for the purpose of transporting the young and 
healthy and strong only, but for the benefit of all alike . . . . The 
plaintiff, notwithstanding her sex, age, and physical condition, had 
the right to avail herself, as a passenger, of the facilities offered by 
the defendant, and it was its duty to adjust the care given her to these 
circumstances, in connection with the necessities arising from the 
physical condition of their facilities.151 
 
The principle of common carriage also dictated that other categories of train 
riders who were, like women, unable to negotiate certain obstacles to passage 
were to receive some extra consideration.  An 1867 New York case involving 
a nine-year-old boy who was killed when he fell off the outside platform of a 
streetcar provides a good example of the way this general doctrine typically 
played out.  The defendants sought an instruction “that the fact that the 
deceased was a child, makes no difference in the application of the rule of law 
as to the question of negligence.”  But, said the appellate court:   
 
A sick or aged person, a delicate woman, a lame man, or a child, is 
entitled to more attention and care from a railroad company than one 
in good health and under no disability.  They are entitled to more time 
in which to get on or off the cars; they are entitled to more 
consideration when crossing a street, to the end that the cars shall not 
run over them.  All these classes are entitled to use the street and to 
ride in the cars; and such haste in starting up, or such speed in driving 
as would be reasonable  care toward others, might well be carelessness 
and neglect towards them.152 
                         
151Walker v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R.R., 178 S.W. 108, 110 (Mo. 1915).  The court reversed 
a defendant’s verdict, finding error in the jury charge, which included the instruction that the 
jury could not base a negligence finding on the absence of a b ox or stool to assist alighting 
passengers. 
152Sheridan v. Brooklyn City & N. R.R., 36 N.Y. 39, 42 (1867). 
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Though women were often grouped with children and people with disabilities 
in discussions like this one, the cases did not actually treat the categories in 
the same way.  The law governing people with disabilities was that the carrier 
had only to accommodate needs known by, or obvious to, its employees, and 
that the employees had no duty to anticipate such needs.153  As a Texas 
appellate court put it in 1908, “It was not [the railroad employees’] duty to use 
ordinary diligence to discover the sick and feeble condition of plaintiff and his 
inability to help himself.”154  People with disabilities had to overcome many 
difficulties of access155 until passage of the civil rights laws of the 1970s and 
later.156  By contrast, as the cases below demonstrate, railroads were required 
to accommodate women’s predictable needs more thoroughly. 
 
2.  Getting On and Off the Train 
 
 The least controversial intersection between common carrier doctrine and 
gender was the requirement that railroads had to provide physical facilities 
that answered women’s needs on entering or disembarking, or risk a jury
                         
153“‘[W]here a person is accepted as a passenger who is unable, through physical or 
mental disability, to care for himself, and this disability is known or made known to the carrier 
at the time of acceptance,’ the carrier is under duty to assist the passenger; ‘but it is not the 
carrier’s duty to anticipate such disabilities or needs, nor to be on the lookout for them.’”  
Southern Ry. v. Hayne, 95 So. 879, 880 (Ala. 1923) (quoting Central of Georgia Ry. v. 
Carlisle, 56 So. 737, 738 (Ala. Ct. App. 1911)).   
154Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Garner, 115 S.W. 273, 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908). 
155See, e.g., Churchill v. United Fruit, 294 F. 400, 401 (D. Mass. 1923) (“Speaking 
generally, common carriers, being obliged to accept as passengers all persons except those 
likely to annoy or endanger other passengers, are required to conduct their business with 
regard to the general run of travelers, and are not required to make provision for special and 
unusual cases” such as persons who are ill.); Young v. Missouri Pac. Ry ., 93 Mo. App. 267 
(1902) (overturning a jury verdict for the plaintiff, holding that she had fallen as she alighted 
from a train because of a somewhat weak ankle, and that because her need for a step was 
therefore unique to her, no grounds existed for a finding that the railroad had been negligent).  
At the same time, however, failure to provide individualized assistance (as opposed to a 
durable piece of equipment, like a step) was frequently grounds for a plaintiff’s judgment, 
when the plaintiff was disabled.  See, e.g., Croom v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 53 N.W. 1128, 
1129 (Minn. 1893) (“If a passenger, because of extreme youth or old age, or any mental or 
physical infirmities, is unable to take care of himself, he ought to be provided with an 
attendant t o take care of him.  But if the company voluntarily accepts a person as a passenger, 
without an attendant, whose inability to care for himself is apparent or made known to its 
servants, and renders special care and assistance necessary, the company is negligent if such 
assistance is not afforded.”); Rice v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power, 141 P. 191, 192 
(Wash. 1914) (holding that when a carrier took on an “aged, crippled, [or] otherwise infirm 
passenger,” it had to give that person time to be seated b efore starting the car). 
156See Lisa G. Lerman and Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination in Access to Public 
Places:  A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 215, 236 - 38, 265 - 69 (1978) (surveying federal and state laws relating to 
people with disabilities and public accommodations, up through 1978); Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 – 12213 (1998). 
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finding of negligence in the event of an accident.157  Accommodation of 
women’s typical needs could be achieved by building a platform, which 
would shorten the distance from the railroad to the ground, by providing a 
step-stool, or by making a porter available.  Courts perceived that women’s 
safety (though perhaps not men’s) necessitated these requirements.158  So, for 
example, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a jury finding of negligence 
against a railroad where the platform was over two feet below the lower steps 
of the cars, “thus compelling the alighting passengers, even women and 
children, to leap from the steps, like chickens from their perches.”159  Indeed, 
courts occasionally issued categorical rules, finding negligence as a matter of 
law for failure to provide a platform for women.  In a 1912 South Carolina 
case, in which the plaintiff had suffered a miscarriage after attempting to get 
off a train that had stopped before it reached the raised platform, the court 
charged the jury as follows: 
 
it is the duty of a railroad company to provide suitable and reasonably 
safe places for its passengers to alight from its trains, and to provide a 
stool or steps, or other appliances, properly and safely placed so as to 
reasonably avoid injury to its passengers alighting from its trains.160 
 
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted that this charge was perhaps too 
specific, but, emphasizing the sex of the plaintiff, found that it was not 
prejudicial:  “It seems to the court that the jury could not have reached, with 
reason, any other conclusion than that due care required that the defendant 
should furnish a light and stool for women alighting from the train.”161 
                         
157Of course, even after the jury found the carrier negligent, the plaintiff had to defeat the 
ever-present charge that she was contributorially negligent before liability would be imposed.  
See infra Part III.B. 
158See Young v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 93 Mo. App. 267 (1902) (railroad put steps to help 
passengers from each car except the smoking car, which was used only by men). 
159Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R.R. v. Wingate, 37 N.E. 274 (Ind. 1895).  The court, however, 
reversed a plaintiff’s verdict, finding contributory negligence as a matter of law in plaintiff’s 
jump from a moving train. 
160Lancaster v. Southern Ry., 75 S.E. 398, 399 (S.C. 1912). 
161Id.; see also Merryman v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 113 N.W. 357, 358 (Iowa 1907) 
(“The legal duty imposed is to provide a reasonably safe exit for all passengers, and not [just] 
for particular classes of persons [i.e. men.]”).   
This type of understanding of women’s  needs was the rule, but not the universal one.  A 
case frequently cited by railroad companies even in this country (though usually distinguished 
or disapproved by the courts) was Siner v. Great Western Ry., 3 L.R. - Ex., 150 (1868), in 
which Judge Bramwell commented about a very long distance from train to ground: “I see no 
evidence that this was a dangerous place.  The witnesses say it was dangerous, but . . . I 
protest that to ordinarily constituted persons I can see no danger.”  Id. at 153.  Women, he 
seems to mean, are not ordinarily constituted persons.  Siner was soon overruled by the British 
courts, in a case involving much the same scenario.  See Robson v. North Eastern Ry., 10 L.R. 
- Q.B. 271 (1876). 
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 Other aspects of railroad and streetcar operations relating to getting on and 
off the car were similarly required to meet women’s needs as a matter of 
course, without special requests by female passengers.  In an 1886 Missouri 
case, the court held that to decide whether the defendant railroad was 
negligent in stopping its car briefly, “the jury are to consider her [the 
plaintiff’s] age, sex, and physical condition.”162  Similarly, in an 1858 
Pennsylvania case, in which the plaintiff, a woman recovering from serious 
illness, was injured attempting to get off a train, the court instructed the jury 
that:  
 
How long a train ought to stop at the various stations may depend upon 
circumstances . . . . It depends upon the peculiar circumstances of each 
particular case; upon the number of passengers to be let out, their age, 
sex, and condition.  Prudence and duty would require of a conductor to 
detain a train longer to pass out fifty aged females, than five active 
men.163 
 
Of course, there were outliers to these mandates to accommodate women.164  
But almost all the cases I read held that it was negligent not to make it easier 
for all healthy women to get on and off trains and streetcars, acknowledging 
that women as a rule needed something to bridge a two or three foot gap 
between the train and the ground, and needed a longer interval to disembark 
than did men.  
 Even when a woman’s inability to disembark safely was due to special 
“delicacy,” often code in these cases for pregnancy, courts often held that 
common carriers had to anticipate the needs of such passengers, and conduct 
their ordinary operations accordingly — even without notice that there was a 
“delicate” passenger present.165  For example, in an 1892 South Carolina case,
                         
162Hickman v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 4 S.W. 127, 128 (Mo. 1886). See also Morrison v. 
Charlotte Elec. Ry. Light & Power, 31 S.E. 720, 721 (N.C. 1898) (“even if it be admitted that 
10 or 12 seconds is sufficient time to allow a woman to get off the car . . . “). 
163Pennsylvania R.R. v. Kilgore, 32 Pa. 292, 293 (1858). 
164For example, in a 1902 Missouri case already cited, Young v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 93 
Mo. App. 267 (1902), the plaintiff was a 38-year-old woman traveling with her baby.  When 
she got out of the train car, she was told to go to the next car — the smoker, typically for men 
only — and exit from there to the platform.  Unlike at all the other cars, the railroad had not 
placed a portable step at the exit from the smoker.  When the plaintiff disembarked, she fell 
and broke her ankle.  The court overturned a jury verdict in her favor, holding that she fell 
because of a somewhat weak ankle, and that her need for a step was therefore unique to her.  
The court stated that she should have given her baby to someone to hold, and taken hold of a 
rail as she stepped carefully down.  It failed to draw the fairly obvious conclusion that in 
putting steps outside all t he cars where women normally would be, the railroad had itself 
acknowledged that more women needed steps than just those with weak ankles. 
165This requirement that the railroads anticipate that some passengers might be pregnant 
differentiated the treatment of pregnant women – and women, more generally – from the 
treatment of persons with disabilities.  See supra notes 153-156 and accompanying text.  My 
reading of the cases is that courts in this era did not engage in the more modern pretense that 
pregnancy is a characteristic unrelated to sex.  Cf. General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 
(1976) (holding discrimination against pregnant women not actionable sex discrimination 
under Title VII); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (discrimination against pregnant 
women not actionable sex discrimination under Equal Protection Clause). 
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the complaint alleged that the plaintiff, “a lady in delicate health,” suffered 
“the displacement of her womb,” when compelled to jump down from a train, 
after it passed the stopping place and no footstool was provided.166  The 
appellate court held that the trial court properly rejected defendant’s claim 
that, as a matter of law, there was no negligence under these facts; the height 
of the step, absence of a stool, and delicate health of the plaintiff could 
combine to support a jury’s finding of negligence.167 
 In addition, when a female passenger affirmatively requested assistance in 
boarding or disembarking, courts found almost universally that failure to 
provide such a service could be negligence.  Thus trains needed to have 
porters or other employees available to provide requested assistance.168  A 
1903 Texas case is typical.169  The plaintiff was injured getting off a train 
while she held a valise in one hand and a child in the other.  The step was two 
feet; usually there was a stool, but not this time.  She had asked for help, but 
                         
166Madden v. Port Royal & W. C. Ry., 14 S.E. 713, 713 (S.C. 1892). 
167Id. at 714; see also St. Louis S. W. Ry. of Tex. v. Ferguson, 64 S.W. 797, 798 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1901) (Conner, C.J.) (surveying case law on pregnant passengers).  If “delicate” 
women particularly needed a footstool, railroads would try to argue that women who were not 
especially delicate did not need one.  In Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. v. Bell, 74 S.W. 700 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1903), the railroad made a variation on this argument, a rguing that black 
women were less deserving of helpful treatment than were white women.  The court, however, 
rejected the railroad’s submission that though footstools were required for accommodation of 
white passengers, they were not necessary for the safe ty of black passengers.  See also St. 
Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Briggs, 113 S.W. 644 (Ark. 1908) (refusing to reverse jury verdict for 
African American plaintiff injured while getting off train, over claim of defendant that the trial 
court should have allowed defense counsel to argue that “the real cause of action was the fact 
that the negro coach passed the depot while the white coach was stopped at the depot 
platform,” because the “evident purpose [of this line of argument] was to stir up race prejudice 
and to hold up appellee to ridicule before the jury”).  But cf. Frances D. Gage, Reminiscences, 
in 1 HISTORY OF W OMAN SUFFRAGE 115, 116 (Elizabeth C. Stanton et al. eds, 2d ed. 1889)  
(“That man over there says women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, 
and to have the best place everywhere.  Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or over mud-
puddles, or gives me any best place!  And ain’t I a woman?” (quoting Sojourner Truth’s 
“Ain’t I a Woman” speech at the 1851 Women’s Rights Convention)). 
168This is not to say that no court ever held that a request for assistance off the train could 
be refused.  I did find one such case, in 1919, in which the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a 
plaintiff’s verdict.  The court held that the complaint did not adequately allege conditions that 
would have imposed a duty on the railroad to assist the plaintiff, even on her request; thus, the 
conductor’s refusal to help her was not negligence.  The opinion also set down a categorical 
rule for when a footstool would be required, holding, as a matter of law, that there was a duty 
to have a footstool for train passengers only when there was a step over three feet high, and 
commenting that a step of less distance was no higher than that required to board other 
vehicles (like buses) that never offered footstools.  See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Farmer, 79 
So. 35, 36 (Ala. 1918). 
169Missouri, K. & T. Ry. of Tex. v. Buchanan, 72 S.W. 96 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903). 
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the porter never arrived.  The jury awarded her $2500, and the appellate court 
upheld the verdict against an appeal claiming insufficient evidence, as a 
matter of law, to support the finding of negligence.  The reviewing court 
stated as the rule that carriers need not ordinarily provide personal assistance, 
but found that where such aid was requested, and where the step was too high 
for the plaintiff to disembark safely, failure to grant the request could 
constitute negligence.170   
 Like the need for a platform or for a long pause at boarding or 
disembarking, the possible need for personal assistance getting on or off a 
train was considered a feminine one.  This is evident from the occasional suit 
by a male accident victim.  For example, in one 1916 Texas case,171 the 
plaintiff was one of several adult male passengers in the white passenger car 
of a train.  There were no women or children in the car.  He slipped, possibly 
on a banana peel.  The jury was charged that it could find negligence if the 
train company should have taken care of the banana peel, or based on the 
railroad’s failure to have an attendant and step stool at the door.  There was a 
$20,000 verdict,172 which was reversed by the appellate court.  The decision 
distinguished each case cited in favor of the proposition that an attendant 
should be available to assist passengers, and commented: 
                         
170Id. at 97. 
171Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. v. Yantis, 185 S.W. 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (Conner, C.J.). 
172I do not know the explanation for this extraordinarily high jury award, which I believe 
was larger than any other award in a case discussed in t his Article.  I have not made a study of 
the impact of the sex of the victim on tort compensation, and extended discussion of how 
gender influenced tort damages is beyond the scope of this Article.  Nonetheless, I can venture 
a few background comments.  First, the black letter law of tort damages was often sex 
specific.  For example, an accident victim’s husband, but not wife, could get damages for loss 
of consortium.  See, e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER, A T REATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 565 (1933).  
In addition, it must have been that early tort laws’ focus on lost earnings, rather than lost non-
economic capacity, led to greater damages for injuries to men than for injuries to women, 
given women’s lesser wage earnings.  On the opposite front, it may be that women were 
compensated at a higher level, if men were compensated at all, for certain types of emotional 
injuries.  See cases cited supra note 150 (regarding tort suits for sexual advances and assaults 
on common carriers).  Cf. Martha Chamallas and Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the 
Law of Fright:  A History, 88 M ICH. L. REV. 814 (1990) (discussing modern cases allowing 
compensation to mothers who witness injuries to their children).  It would be interesting, but 
difficult, to examine compensation not related to wage-earning capacity to see if men and 
women received comparable damage awards for similar injuries.  For discussion of some of 
the modern issues relating to gender and tort damages, see Chamallas, Questioning Data, 
supra note 15 (arguing that use of race- and gender-specific data to predict likely future wages 
for purposes of calculating tort damages violates the Equal Protection Clause); Lucinda 
Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847 
(1997); Elaine Gibson, Identifying Gender Bias in Personal Injury Compensation, in 
INVESTIGATING GENDER BIAS:   LAW COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 87 - 96 (Joan 
Brockman & Dorothy E. Chunn eds., 1993); Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death: 
Gender Bias in Wrongful Death Damage Awards, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 263 (1991) (examining 
statistical and jury simulation evidence). 
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We know of no case which goes so far as to hold that where the 
passenger is an adult male, in full health, and the platform, car, and 
steps are clear of obstructions and without defect, and where, as shown 
in this case, the distance from the lower step of the car to the depot 
platform is but 18 inches, that it is incumbent upon the carrier of 
passengers to have an attendant to assist him in alighting.  As it seems 
to us, under such circumstances, the carrier has the right to assume that 
the passenger will exercise that degree of care required of him for his 
own safety, and that a passenger of the character indicated, so acting, 
will be able to safely alight without assistance.173 
 
In a case some years earlier about injuries to a woman, the same judge was 
remarkably more sympathetic about a claimed need for assistance in 
disembarking.174  In that case, the court focused on a claim of contributory 
negligence in reviewing a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $6000 for injury 
his wife incurred in disembarking from a train while carrying a bag weighing 
sixty pounds.  The defendants argued that it was contributory negligence as a 
matter of law for the plaintiff to attempt to get down the stairs with her arms 
full.  The court disagreed, noting that she was in good health, and was strong 
enough to carry the bag.  
 
It seems to be extending the doctrine of contributory negligence to 
great lengths to say that the issue is raised by the mere fact that a 
passenger on a railway train concludes to take his or her grip along at 
the time of leaving rather than leave it behind . . . . Had appellant’s 
porter been there to assist her, as it was his duty to do [according to his 
own testimony], it is unlikely that the grip would have contributed to 
her injury.175 
 
 It might seem that the difference between what assistance courts found 
was owed to women and what to men is not unlike the difference between 
what protections the Supreme Court held Congress could legislate for women 
workers and what for men.176  But the courts discussing assistance in alighting 
for women did not engage in the rhetoric of control that the Supreme Court 
used in Muller v. Oregon to justify upholding protective legislation for 
women, but not men.  In that case, Justice Brewer wrote: “[H]istory discloses 
the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man.  He established his
                         
173Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. v. Yantis, 185 S.W. 969, 972 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (Conner, 
C.J.). 
174Chicago, R. I. & T. Ry. v. Armes, 74 S.W. 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) (Conner, C.J.). 
175Id. at 79.  
176See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).  
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control at the outset by superior physical strength, and this control in various 
forms, with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present. . . . It is 
impossible to close one’s eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and 
depends upon him.”177  The judicial rhetoric justifying a rule requiring certain 
types of assistance for women simply did not use this kind of subordinating 
rhetoric.   
 Moreover, courts drew careful doctrinal lines about what kinds of 
accommodations trains and streetcars had to offer women, and what kinds 
they did not — lines that a Muller type analysis would not have supported.  
For example, although courts consistently held that assistance had to be 
available to answer women’s request for help, they rejected the categorical 
rule that all women had to be offered assistance.  A contemporary A.L.R. 
annotation stated in summary that “the rule is universal that ordinarily there is 
no duty to assist passengers from the train.”178  Typical was a 1916 Wisconsin 
case179 in which the court dismissed a jury verdict for the plaintiff on the 
grounds that there had been no negligence contributing to her severe fall in 
attempting to disembark from a train.  She had not requested assistance, and 
the court commented:  “Plaintiff was a woman about 46 years of age, in good 
health, and burdened with only a light hand bag when she fell, and the car was 
standing still at a terminal station.  Under such circumstances no duty 
devolved upon defendants to assist her in alighting.”180 
                         
177Id. at 421 - 22. 
178Annotation, Duty and Liability of Carrier as to Assisting Passenger to Board or Alight 
from Car or Train, 55 A.L.R. 389, 389 (1928).  The rule that it was not negligence to fail to 
offer assistance to every woman passenger frequently prevailed notwithstanding railroads’ 
work rules that porters and conductors should volunteer such assistance to women getting off 
a train.  In the leading case of Central of Georgia Ry. v. Carlisle, 56 So. 737, 738 (Ala. Ct. 
App. 1911) (per curiam), for example, the court held that “the duty [to assist women 
passengers, contained in the defendant’s written work rules] was gratuitously assumed, and, 
unless known to and relied upon by s uch a passenger to her hurt, nonconformity thereto by its 
agents would impose no liability on the carrier.”   
179Gardner v. Chicago & M. Elec. Ry., 159 N.W. 1066 (Wis. 1916). 
180Id. at 1067; see also Indianapolis Traction & Terminal v. Pressell, 77 N.E. 357 (Ind. 
App. 1906) (reversing a plaintiff’s verdict, and holding that streetcar conductor had no duty to 
volunteer to help her get out, despite a three-foot step); Dorcey v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & 
Light, 203 N.W. 327, 328 (Wis. 1925) (“There was nothing in the circumstances of this case 
to lead the conductor . . . to suppose that the plaintiff was in need of help in alighting from the 
car.  She was a strong, vigorous, able -bodied woman, and it was quite apparent that her 
injuries, though painful and serious, are the result of unavoidable accident.”). 
It seems likely that judicial insistence that able -bodied women could not expect an 
affirmative offer of help was, at least sometimes, imbued with ideas about class-appropriate 
behavior.  In Louisville & N. R.R. v. King, 73 So. 456 (Ala. 1916), for example, the court 
commented that: 
 
Plaintiff was young and able -bodied; she had been accustomed to labor of a sort that 
necessarily implied at least the usual s trength of women of her age; she did the work 
of her household; she did the cooking and washing, and she helped her husband in 
the field.  There was nothing to put her in the class of the aged, the very young, 
infirm, or helpless passengers, to whom railroad companies are under obligation to 
furnish aid in getting on or alighting from trains. . . . We have been unable to find in 
the evidence any indication that she was not as able as the ordinary passenger. 
 
Id. at 456 - 57.  The court in this case seems to have decided to make its own credibility 
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 Unrequested personal assistance on or off trains would have been 
somewhat intrusive for women and quite burdensome for railroads, and given 
the rule that railroads had to meet any actual request by a woman for help 
alighting or boarding, courts were unwilling to adopt or ratify a sex-
categorical rule that women had to be offered such assistance.  Instead, most 
courts agreed, railroads had an affirmative obligation to offer assistance only 
where they had notice of a passenger’s special need for it.    
 The courts held, however, that notice could be implied by the obviousness 
of the need.  One circumstance where the need might be obvious was when a 
plaintiff — male or female — was obviously disabled in some way.181  Thus, 
in 1911, the leading case of Central of Georgia Ry. v. Carlisle  held that there 
was no duty to volunteer personal assistance to passengers, unless there is 
“physical or mental disability,” combined with notice of the disability to the 
railroad.182   The court insisted, however, that a healthy and only mildly 
encumbered woman did not fit its criteria: “the condition of the plaintiff when 
she sought to alight was not one of obvious infirmity or disability, although 
she was carrying ‘a valise, a parasol, and a fan’.”183 
 At the same time, however, circumstances frequently could create an 
affirmative duty to render assistance even to healthy persons, particularly in
                                                           
determinations, an unusual event (though less so 80 years ago than now).  The opinion noted 
that “[s]ome of her neighbors made affidavits to the effect that in the meantime she seemed to 
enjoy her usual health and strength, did her usual work, helped her husband cultivate his crop, 
picked cotton, and ‘toted’ her 17 months old baby around the neighborhood” and continued 
further to say that the jury’s award of $3000 would have been excessive, even if it had not been 
otherwise in error.  Id. at 457; see also San Antonio R.R. v. Wiuvar, 207 S.W. 667, 669 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1924) (describing a Mexican plaintiff as a “strong healthy female”). 
181Both men and women could be disabled, for purposes of this rule.  See, e.g., Croom v. 
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 53 N.W. 1128 (Minn. 1893) (affirming jury finding that defendant 
railroad was negligent in failing to assist infirm male passenger onto train).  Women’s 
“disabilities” might in some circumstances be gender-related, because of the already-discussed 
fragility of women’s reproductive health in the period of this paper.  See, e.g., Steketee v. 
Waters, 159 N.W. 368, 370 (Mich. 1916) (holding that the duty owed a woman who had 
received an operation for “female trouble” was the “degree of care” owed a “sick, aged, or 
otherwise infirm passenger”).  
18256 So. 737, 738 (Ala. Ct. App. 1911) (per curiam). 
183Id.; see also, e.g. Dickinson v. Tucker, 176 P. 949, 951 (Okla. 1918) (Reversing jury 
verdict for female plaintiff injured as she disembarked from train while carrying a large piece 
of luggage, and holding that duty to assist railway passengers exists only “in the case of a sick, 
old, or infirm passenger, or one making request for assistance.”). 
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two situations:  a hidden hazard, or an obvious burden.  Here, courts 
recognized that women were more likely than men to be hampered by such 
circumstances, and to need assistance—and courts upheld jury charges and 
verdicts that required railroads to conduct themselves accordingly.  Typical 
was a Texas case in 1907 in which the defendant streetcar company appealed 
a jury verdict of $3500 for the plaintiff, complaining that the trial judge’s 
instructions allowed the jury to find negligence in the conductor’s failure to 
help the plaintiff off, “the undisputed evidence being that she was a young, 
strong, robust, and active woman.” 184  The trial court upheld the instruction, 
commenting that while there is no duty to assist a fit passenger in ordinary 
circumstances, here, where the steps were dangerous (covered with mud and 
very slippery), such a duty might arise:  
 
The error which, it seems to us, counsel have fallen into, is the idea that 
such a duty can arise only in the case of a crippled or infirm passenger 
or one incumbered with a load, and that, if the passenger is physically 
sound and unincumbered, there can be no situation in which a duty 
devolves on the carrier to take precautions for his or her safety in 
alighting.185 
 
Although the court did not discuss gender in this passage, the defendant’s 
argument revealed the importance of gender in the case.  The defendant 
argued that the jury charge required it to assist women who did not need 
assistance; it had tried unsuccessfully at trial to introduce testimony that one 
witness “had repeatedly seen women get on and off cars without assistance, 
and that in his opinion there was no necessity in assisting one who was not old 
or infirm or did not have bundles, babies, or something of the kind 
carrying.”186 
 Similarly, in a 1911 North Carolina case,187 the plaintiff, a fifty-eight-year-
old woman, broke her hip getting off a streetcar; the car had stopped on a hill, 
making the step down very long.  The appellate court upheld a plaintiff’s 
judgment over a challenge to the jury charge on negligence, restating the rule 
of the instruction as “[w]hether, in view of all the evidence, a reasonably 
prudent man would have allowed the plaintiff, incumbered with the skirts of 
her sex, to get off a car of that height without assistance, at a place where the 
ground was steeply sloping,” and holding that the issue, so stated, was 
properly left for the jury.188  And in a 1927 Alabama case, the court held that
                         
184San Antonio Traction Co. v. Flory, 100 S.W. 200, 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907). 
185Id. at 201. 
186Id. at 201 - 02. 
187Morarity v. Durham Traction Co., 70 S.E. 938 (N.C. 1911). 
188Id. at 939.  
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“[t]he care of a baby in arms presents a case well within the generally 
prevailing doctrine that where personal assistance is seen to be needed, duty 
demands it should be rendered . . . . The right of the lady passenger to travel 
with her baby is unquestioned.”189 Thus, although the sex of a woman 
passenger, alone, was not a special circumstance that made an offer of 
assistance necessary, gender weighed in favor of a finding of negligence 
based on a defendant’s failure to offer, and could combine with other 
circumstances (sometimes, like care of a baby, themselves related to gender) 
to impose the duty. 
 In the cases and circumstances discussed in this section, in which railroads 
were frequently found negligent based on their failure to provide an injury-
preventing accommodation to a female passenger, it is easy to see how men 
and women might be differently situated.  Women’s clothing, reproductive 
health, etc. — all the factors of gender difference discussed above190 — were, 
generally speaking, obviously connected to the needs and injuries described in 
the cases.  And the cases demonstrate that underlying courts’ general 
willingness to require railroads to accommodate women’s needs were those 
courts’ assessments of which types of accommodations of gender difference 
were necessary for reasonable access.  
 
3.  Personal Assistance beyond Help Boarding and Disembarking 
 
 Other requested accommodations were more onerous for railroads, and 
less tied to obvious gender difference.  Help waking up for the stop, gathering 
parcels, getting to the train door — all these were the subject of suits by
                         
189Southern Ry. v. Laxson, 114 So. 290, 292 (Ala. 1927).  The court in Laxson fit its rule 
within the category of “disability,” noting just before the passage quoted in text, “[d]isability 
need not arise from p hysical or mental infirmity alone.”  Id. But see Illinois Cent. R.R. v. 
Cruse, 96 S.W. 821, 823 (Ky. 1906): 
 
All assistance that a conductor may extend to ladies without escorts, or with children, 
or to persons who are sick and ask his assistance in getting on and off trains, is 
purely a matter of courtesy, and not at all incumbent upon him in the line of his 
public duty. . . . 
 
The plaintiff fell because her hands were occupied in holding her sleeping child and 
the valise. . . . Obviously, it is not incumbent of the employés  of a carrier of 
passengers, on their own initiative, to render any special service to one or more 
passengers to the exclusion of others; their whole duty being to secure the safety and 
comfort of all. It certainly is not their duty to be on the lookout to discover that any 
particular passenger needs special assistance. 
 
In its careful attention to the facts, this opinion was typical.  
But in its legal holding, it was an outlier. 
190See supra text accompanying notes 130 - 141. 
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women who claimed damages for injuries from failure of trains to give help of 
his kind, when it was requested.  But when a plaintiff’s case was premised on 
a railroad’s failure to meet one of these types of requests, appellate courts 
almost always described such requests as seeking courteous treatment rather 
than safe access, and frequently reversed jury verdicts for the plaintiff.  
Passages in court opinions, such as those quoted below, acknowledge that 
female passengers’ desire or expectation for these kinds of services may well 
have been greater than that of male passengers.  But courts showed little 
inclination to require railroads to satisfy such gendered expectations.  
 In a typical case, in Georgia in 1898,191 the plaintiff’s husband asked the 
conductor to help his wife, who had with her a three-week-old baby, off the 
train.  Said the appellate court, “This, as an act of courtesy, he promised to 
do.”192  But, the court continued, because neither husband nor wife told the 
conductor why she needed help, or that she was sick, his promise was not 
binding on the company.  In any event, the court found, the presence of an 
employee at the platform to help people off was enough to comply with the 
promise to help:  
 
It would greatly delay the business of the company if it could be held, 
on such a promise, that it was the duty of the conductor to go to the 
seats of all the ladies who had made similar requests, and assist them, 
one by one, to the platform of the car, and down safely to the ground.193 
 
Similarly, in 1895, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the railroad had 
no duty to live up to a conductor’s promise to awaken a sleeping passenger 
who was on the train with her two children, one of whom was sick.194  The 
court commented, 
 
Common decency, as well as humanity, would always suggest that a 
lady with two helpless children should be treated by the agent with the 
utmost kindness and consideration, and anything short of this would 
fall short of his duty as a man.  But the question is, was there any act on 
his part, as agent of appellant, which would authorize a recovery of 
damages against the railway company?195 
                         
191Western & A. R.R. v. Earwood, 29 S.E. 913 (Ga. 1898). 
192Id. at 913. 
193Id. at 914.  Because these cases tended to involve a request for assistance that was 
agreed to by the conductor, but then neglected, a doctrine frequently used, as here, to release 
the railroad from liability was that such promises were beyond the scope of the conductor’s 
authority.   
194Missouri K. & T. Ry. of Texas v. Kendrick, 32 S.W. 42 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). 
195Id. at 44 - 45. 
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The court answered no.196   
 However, as in many of these doctrinal areas, nothing was totally clear cut.  
If the infirmity of the passenger was clear, assistance became more necessary 
for safe use of trains and streetcars, and promises of assistance in all sorts of 
areas might correspondingly become binding on the railroad.  In this area, as 
in the cases dealing with a claimed obligation to offer assistance to all women 
boarding and disembarking, courts were unwilling to impose on railroads the 
general obligation to take on time consuming duties, and instead looked for 
the presence or absence of special circumstances.  Gender informed legal 
assessment of those circumstances, but was not itself considered special; that 
is, the female sex of a plaintiff was frequently a factor in her alleged need for 
special treatment, but could not alone justify a judicially imposed duty to 
provide such treatment.  For example, the jury awarded $75 in an 1895 Texas 
case197 in which a husband brought suit for damages because his wife was 
carried past her station, and forced to wait overnight before being carried 
back, delaying medical treatment of their sick child.  The appellate court 
upheld the verdict.  Noting that “circumstances, involving the consideration of 
age, sex, or physical infirmity, may bring that within the scope of the 
conductor’s duty toward a passenger which would, otherwise, be beyond the 
limit of such obligation” such as a promise of personal notification about the 
station, the court held that preoccupation while caring for a sick child is one 
such circumstance, if the conductor knows about it.198  
 
4.  Summary of the Gendered Obligations of Railroads 
 
 In sum, there were numerous areas in which courts imposed on trains a 
duty to accommodate women’s needs — needs seen as gendered, but 
nonetheless reasonable.  Courts described women’s “right” to certain
                         
196Id. at 45; see also Southern Ry. v. Hobbs, 45 S.E. 23, 25 - 26 (Ga. 1903) (any custom 
of giving special assistance to unattended female passengers “[amounts] to no more than a 
practice on the part of obliging and chivalrous conductors to render to ladies courteous 
attention, which they were not, in their capacity as ordinary members of the traveling public, 
entitled to demand as matter of right”).  This case, however, may illustrate the court’s 
reluctance to accommodate the plaintiff’s physical disability as much as its reluctance to 
accommodate women in this particular regard.    
197Chicago, R. I. & T. Ry. v. Boyles, 33 S.W. 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). 
198Id. at 249.  The verdict was, however, reversed on the issue of proximate cause.  See 
also Southern Ry. v. Herron, 68 So. 551, 552 (Ala. Ct. App. 1915) (“While ordinarily the 
carrier is under no duty to give the passenger personal notice that his particular station has 
been reached, ‘exceptional circumstances, however, may impose this duty, as where 
conditions of age, sex, or physical infirmity may bring that within the scope of the conductor’s 
duty toward a passenger, although otherwise it would be beyond the limit of such obligation.’” 
(quoting ROBERT HUTCHINSON,  A  TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS § 1121 (J. Scott 
Matthews & William F. Dickenson eds., 3d ed. 1906))).  
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accommodations, which the opinions presented as necessary for women to 
enjoy reasonable access to trains and streetcars.  But where courts considered 
requested accommodations to be less necessary for women, their provision by 
the railroads was described as a matter of courtesy, not duty, and courts would 
impose a duty to provide the accommodations only in “special” 
circumstances.  Female sex was not special, for these purposes—though it 
could favor a finding of negligence, it could not alone support such a finding. 
 
B.  Duties of Women Passengers on Trains 
 
1.  Gendered Expectations 
 
 The cases discussed above are about the tort system’s expectations about 
what was reasonable behavior by carriers.  Of course, the law had 
expectations for the women involved in accidents, as well.  The railroad’s 
typical defense in these suits was contributory negligence;199 gender played a 
crucial role in this arena of contest over what courts expected of women.   
 By contrast with the scholarship treating the historical “reasonable man” 
standard,200 the cases indicate that women’s lawyers, railroads, and courts did 
not typically present women as by nature childlike, disabled, or otherwise 
unreasonable or incapable of taking care.  Quite the contrary; like women’s 
lawyers, railroads and courts sympathetic to the railroads would frequently
                         
199Sometimes the railroads and the courts would make arguments that sound to the 
modern ear more like assumption of the risk than contributory negligence.  As Justice 
Rutledge commented in Owens v. Union Pac. R.R., 319 U.S. 715 (1943): 
 
The common-law defenses, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the 
fellow-servant rule were originated and developed in common ground.  Not entirely 
identical in conception, they conjoined and overlapped in many applications.  The 
overlapping areas first concealed, then created a confusion which only served to 
create more; so that in time the three became more, rather than less, 
indistinguishable. 
 
Id. at 720.  In general, it was held that the proper defense was not assumption of the risk, but 
contributory negligence.  See, e.g., United Rys. & Elec. v. Riley, 71 A. 970, 974 (Md. Ct. App. 
1909) (“The doctrine of assumed risks or waiver of right of action, which has most frequent 
application to the relation of master and servant, while theoretically distinct, in its practical 
application to ordinary negligence cases between passengers and carriers, not affected by any 
contractual relation other than the implied contractual obligations between them, necessarily, it 
would seem, involves the doctrine of contributory negligence . . . .”); Fillingham v. St. Louis 
Trans., 77 S.W. 314, 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903) (holding that assumption of the risk cannot apply 
in train cases, because it is a theory of implied contract, and “the law forbids a carrier to 
contract against the consequences of any negligence it may be guilty of in conveying 
passengers”).  
200See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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argue that they, too, were interested in increasing women’s freedom.  In an 
1883 Michigan case,201 for example, the state supreme court overturned a jury 
verdict for the female plaintiff, who broke her ankle as she mistakenly got off 
the train at a crossing; the train stopped for the crossing just after the 
conductor called out the station’s name.  The court reversed a jury finding of 
negligence, stating: “The company . . . cannot be expected to treat its 
passengers as children, or to put them under restraint.”202  This kind of 
libertarian language was somewhat commonplace in similar cases,203 and the 
railroad companies urged it as a jury charge.204   
 More generally, the fight in these cases was over perceived gender 
difference, and who was responsible for accommodating it.  The train 
companies tried to argue that inasmuch as women were different from men, 
the women should bear the burden of that difference.  Thus, the railroads 
claimed that if a woman, unlike a man, could not safely step down a distance 
of three feet, she should not be able to recover if she attempted to jump the 
distance — the attempt should be considered contributory negligence.  The 
procedural posture of the cases varied: sometimes the argument concerned the 
jury charge, with the railroad seeking a very strict instruction; sometimes the 
argument targeted the verdict, with the railroad seeking judgment as a matter 
of law.  The real subject was access:  whether women would have complete 
access to travel accommodations.  The circumstances determined the precise 
contours of the argument.  When help was at least somewhat available, but the 
passenger did not request or await it, the carrier would typically allege that 
such failure should bar recovery.205  When help was not available, the 
railroads were forced by the facts to argue, for example, that the passenger 
should have stayed on the train past her stop, gone and looked for help, and 
then requested the train to go back.206  In almost every case, the doctrinal 
category used to structure this fight was contributory negligence, framed in
                         
201Mitchell v. Chicago & G. T. Ry., 16 N.W. 388 (Mich. 1883). 
202Id. at 389. 
203See, e.g., Midland Valley R.R. v. Page, 182 F. 125, 128 (E.D. Okla. 1910) (quoting 
Mitchell); Malcom v. Richmond & D. R.R., 11 S.E. 187 (N.C. 1890); Falls v. San Francisco & 
N. P. R.R., 31 P. 901, 902 (Cal. 1893) (quoting Malcom).   
204See Sellars v. Southern Pac. Co., 166 P. 599, 603 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d  1917) 
(upholding trial judge’s rejection of the jury instruction suggested by the railroad — “A 
railroad company cannot be expected to treat its passengers as children, or to put them under 
restraint.  Passengers must take the responsibility of informing themselves concerning the 
everyday incidents of railway traveling, and the company could do business upon no other 
basis” — because the instruction was “argumentative, obscure, and commonplace.”).  
205See, e.g., McDermott v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 52 N.W. 85 (Wis. 1892) (reversing $3000 
plaintiff’s verdict, where plaintiff asked railway employee for help, but then did not wait for 
him to finish helping her before she got off and was injured). 
206See, e.g., Louisville & N. R.R. v. Lee, 12 So. 48 (Ala. 1892), discussed infra note 209. 
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one case as, “how a prudent mind would have guided the action of such a 
body as she [the plaintiff] possessed.”207  
 As in the cases discussed in Part I, in which a woman had to claim that she 
had no control over a car driven by her husband while arguing that she took 
reasonable care for her own safety, the imperatives of the doctrinal categories 
required a female accident victim to make a rhetorically tricky claim.  In 
situations where the cause of the accident was a condition more dangerous to 
women than men, a woman seeking compensation first had to argue that the 
railroad had been negligent in failing to provide whatever accommodation 
was necessary.  But then she had to argue that her own attempt to enter or 
alight from the train was not foolhardy, despite risk of harm that was usually 
obvious.  Essentially, she needed to undo the symmetry between negligence 
and contributory negligence — to argue that negligent creation of risk covered 
more ground than prudent avoidance of risk.208  Speaking more morally 
(probably a mode truer to the sources) she needed to argue that her ability to 
travel was important enough that when railroads burdened that ability by 
failing to provide an accommodation women predictably required, the 
railroads should pay for ensuing accidents; women should bear neither the 
cost of the accident nor the inconvenience of avoiding the negligently created 
risks.  
 In responding to these cases, courts took seriously women’s need to board 
or disembark, and refused to require them to hold themselves disabled by the 
defendants’ negligence.  They could, rather, attempt to deal with the situation 
and then recover if the risk of injury was realized.209  Passengers could be 
                         
207Hickman v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 4 S.W. 127, 128 (Mo. 1886). 
208SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE  320 - 21, § 282 (1st ed. 1867), makes this 
point more generally, arguing that a passenger ought not be deemed guilty of contributory 
negligence if injured while taking a risk that was outweighed by the need to travel or to get 
home.  The treatise gives a number of examples of cases where male passengers may take 
known risks, but nonetheless recover if injured.  For example, a man may get off at a 
dangerous landing place, “rather than be carried miles away from home”; or may “get[] on a 
car in moderate motion,” “where (as is frequently the case) the drivers of horse cars constantly 
refuse to come to a full stop for a male passenger”.  It summarizes, “In all these and similar 
cases, a passenger might directly  contribute to his own injury, and yet act prudently in taking 
the risk.”   
Perhaps judicial willingness to uncouple negligence and contributory negligence was one 
manifestation of discomfort with the harsh regime of contributory, rather than comparative, 
negligence. 
209See, e.g., Delamatyr v. Milwaukee & P. C. R.R., 24 Wis. 578 (1869).  The court stated: 
 
‘[T]he fair result of the evidence is, that though an adult male could have jumped 
down easily, yet a female passenger would encounter some danger in descending. 
But then the alternative is presented, that, if it was dangerous to descend, she ought 
to have returned to her place in the carriage. I am clearly of the opinion, however, 
that a railway company are not entitled to expose any passenger to the necessity of 
choosing between two alternatives, neither of which he could lawfully be called on 
to choose: namely, either to go on . . ., or to take his chance of danger and jump out; 
and if they do so, the choice is made it their peril.’(quoting Siner v. The Great 
Western R. Co., 3 L. Rep., Exch. 150, 155 (1868) (Kelly, C.B., dissenting)). 
 
Cf. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Lee, 12 So. 48 (Ala. 1892), a case in which the accident 
happened when the train did not wait long enough at a station.  As it started to pull away, 
plaintiff,”in her enfeebled condition” jumped off.  Id. at 48.  The court held that, 
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excused from taking a risk, even a known risk, if it was created by the 
negligence of the railroad and if it was not too great.  As they did in analyzing 
negligence, courts sometimes talked about the “rights” of the women 
passengers.  In an 1884 Michigan case, for example, a woman passenger who 
got off a train in the dark, from the rear, was not barred from recovering just 
because she did not go to the front car where there was light.  The court held 
generally, “the same facts which tend to show negligence in the railroad 
company tend in the same degree to show that the plaintiff was without fault. 
If she had a right to assume that the landing place was safe, she was not 
negligent in stepping down as she did.”210 
 Even without rights talk, courts did not allow defendants to make too 
much of women’s inability to surmount small obstacles, if it seemed to the 
woman, ex ante , that there was little risk.  In one 1904 Iowa case, for 
example, the plaintiff was injured trying to board a streetcar while her hands 
were full of laundry (her business was washing).211  The court held in 
response to a claim of contributory negligence by the defendant that “Women 
do this daily in carrying babies, bandboxes, and birdcages, and what is so 
commonly accomplished without injury or thought of danger ought not to be 
held, as a matter of law, to be negligent.”212  Similarly, in a 1912 California 
case, the plaintiff, 
                                                           
notwithstanding a jury verdict, her actions were reckless, and barred recovery.  She should have 
gone to the conductor and asked to be brought back: “he was legally bound [since it was his 
fault for not pausing long enough], a t her request, to stop, return, and put her off, or, in default, 
the company would have been responsible to her for the damage it did her.”  Id.  When she 
jumped, therefore, “she herself took the risk of the peril involved in the venture.”  Id. 
210Cartwright v. Chicago & G. T. Ry., 18 N.W. 380, 382 (1884) (Cooley, C.J.) The 
general principle that passengers should be able to assume that carriers would act 
nonnegligently was made as well in Caley v. Kansas City, 48 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1932), in which 
a plaintiff won a verdict of $3500 for an injury incurred as she attempted to get off a streetcar.  
The carrier appealed on the ground that she had been contributorially negligent as a matter of 
law.  The court upheld the finding (though it vacated the verdict on an issue having to do with 
special notice to the municipal defendant).  The court held categorically that “[n]egligence 
cannot be imputed to a passenger because she does not anticipate culpable negligence on the 
part of the carrier.”  Id. at 29.   Sometimes, courts used the language of “rights” in discussing 
alleged contributory negligence of passengers with disabilities, as well.  See, e.g., Mercer v. 
Cincinnati N. R.R., 115 N.W. 733, 734 (Mich. 1908) (finding plaintiff, who had a leg injury 
that impeded her mobility, free of contributory negligence because she had “expect[ed], as she 
had a right to expect, that defendant’s employes would meet her and assist her in alighting.”). 
211Jaques v. Sioux City Traction Co., 99 N.W. 1069 (Iowa 1904). 
212Id. at 1071. 
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a woman well advanced in years, . . . was nevertheless in obust health, 
active, capable of performing and did perform, prior to the accident, the 
household duties for her family . . . . From these facts it is reasonable to 
infer that, under ordinary circumstances, she was capable of handling 
the small baggage she carried with her without any great inconvenience 
or trouble. 213 
 
Thus, said the court, her encumbrances could not bar her from recovering 
when she fell in the darkness at a train platform.214  
 However, where a plaintiff attempted to get on or off a moving train, she 
went over the line of permissible risk-taking:  although men’s mobility was 
protected by tort doctrine that accepted that they often did embark and alight 
from moving trains,215 when the train was moving at all fast, courts generally 
enforced a per se rule that a female passenger who jumped off, except in dire 
peril, could not recover.216  For example the Louisiana Supreme Court held in 
1903, “The law is well settled that a passenger, particularly a lady passenger, 
who has parcels with her, should not seek to alight while the train is still 
running.”217   
 When the train was moving only slowly, a more nuanced, but still often 
gendered, approach was required.  In an 1890 Arkansas case, for example, the 
court said that the plaintiff’s 
 
age, sex and physical condition were circumstances necessarily 
affecting her safety in stepping from a moving train, and should have 
been considered by the jury, in connection with all other such 
circumstances in proof, in determining whether she acted prudently or 
recklessly.  A young active man might prudently alight, when the 
attempt would be reckless in an old or lame man; and any man might 
do so prudently, when it would be dangerous for a lady in female attire 
to attempt it.218 
                         
213Teale v. Southern Pac. Co., 129 P. 949, 954 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912). 
214Id. 
215See, e.g., Hull v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. Ry., 133 N.W. 852, 855 (Minn. 1911) 
(male plaintiff was not contributorially negligent as a matter of law for jumping onto a slowly 
moving train: “the passenger making the attempt was physically active and his freedom of 
motion unimpeded, and there were reasons justifying him in continuing his journey on the 
particular train”). 
216See, e.g., Chicago, T. H. & S. E. Ry. v. Collins, 108 N.E. 377 (Ind. App. 1915). 
217McMichael v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 34 So. 110, 112 (La. 1903);  see also Louisville & N. 
R.R. v. Lee, 12 So. 48 (Ala. 1892), discussed supra note 209. 
218Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. v. Tankersley, 14 S.W. 1099 (Ark. 1890). See also Little Rock 
& Ft. S. Ry. v. Harkey, 15 S.W. 456, 457 (Ark. 1891), a case in which the railroad asked for a 
charge directing special attention to “the jury’s right to take into consideration ‘the age, sex, 
and physical condit ion of the plaintiff,’ as affecting her safety in attempting to alight from a 
moving train.”  The trial court charged the jury only that all the circumstances could be 
considered, and the appellate court refused to overturn the jury verdict, holding that while the 
requested instruction would have been fine, so was the instruction given.  Id. at 457-58. 
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Similarly, in a 1909 Massachusetts case, the defendant asked the judge to 
instruct the jury “that for a woman such as this plaintiff encumbered with 
bundles as was this woman to attempt to board a moving car is lack of due 
care as a matter of law.” 219  The judge refused, and the appellate court upheld 
that refusal, commenting that “if the car was just starting and was barely 
moving, we do not think attempting to board it is negligent as a matter of 
law.”220  
 Still, even if the jury could be instructed to consider gendered attributes as 
contributing to the level of risk , courts were very unfriendly to any claim that 
men and women should be held to different levels of care.  The defendant 
made this kind of claim in an 1899 North Carolina case,221 appealing a jury 
award of $2500 to the plaintiff for an injury maintained as she attempted to 
get off a streetcar. The company appealed on several grounds, including an 
argument that, “as the care to be exercised by a woman, when she is placed in 
a dangerous position, would be greater than that required of a man surrounded 
by the same circumstances.”222  The appeals court was not well disposed 
toward the plaintiff, commenting that “[i]f this Court were permitted to 
criticize the verdicts of juries, we might have something to say concerning the 
one delivered in this case; but that is forbidden ground to us.”223  Nonetheless, 
the court held that there was nothing in the decision cited by the defendant as 
authority224 “which even squints toward a holding that a woman is not bound 
by the rule of ‘the prudent man,’ but ordinarily by a stricter rule.” 225  
 A final case encapsulates much of the gendered dynamic of these female 
train passenger cases.  The plaintiff in Eichorn v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas 
Railway was a “strong, healthy Norwegian woman, who, unaided, had done 
all of her own housework.” 226  On a winter day in 1892 she intended to go by 
train with a friend from Harriston, where they both lived, to a neighboring 
town.  They got on from the east side of the tracks because they did not want 
to run in front of the moving train, and because men at the blacksmith shop, 
on the other side, liked to sit and look at ladies getting on the train.  Mrs. 
                         
219Payne v. Springfield St. Ry., 89 N.E. 536, 538 (Mass. 1909). 
220Id.; see also Filer v. New York Cent. R.R., 49 N.Y. 47 (1872); Haas v. Wichita R. & 
Light Co., 132 P. 195 (Kan. 1913). 
221Asbury v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., Light & Power, 34 S.E. 654 (N.C. 1899). 
222Id. at 657. 
223Id. at 656. 
224The defendant cited High v. Carolina Cent. R.R., 17 S.E. 79 (N.C. 1893) (fact that the 
plaintiff wore a bonnet that covered her ears on a windy day did not relieve her of her 
obligation to listen for oncoming trains, and even should have made her more watchful). 
225Asbury, 34 S.E. at 657. 
22632 S.W. 993, 995 (Mo. 1895).  Welke, Unreasonable Women, supra note 15, discusses 
this case at some length.  I rely where indicated on her research of the record. 
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Eichorn preferred if possible to have her back to them, rather than face them.  
In addition, the Court noted, 
 
the evidence tended strongly to show that, after the burning of the 
depot, passengers got on and off the train at this point on both sides of 
the road.  The porters on the trains, when they would stop at Harriston 
station, would get down on either side and help passengers on from 
which ever side they might be standing, and would also help them off 
on either side.227 
 
 There was no box to help passengers get on the train, and on this particular 
day no porters, either. While her friend boarded without incident, Mrs. 
Eichorn slipped, sprained her ankle, and fell down hard.  The eventual result 
was partial paralysis of her right side.228  The jury rendered a plaintiff’s 
verdict of $3000, and the railroad appealed.  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
affirmed with an analysis extremely sensitive to the two, gendered, issues 
raised. First, the court recognized that the question of negligence was, on a 
close look, a question about what the carrier could reasonably expect from its 
passengers.  That is, could a railroad require that each of its passengers either 
be agile or herself take the consequences? The court emphatically answered 
no: “Carriers of passengers should expect that both old and young women, 
feeble and delicate people, as well as the strong and robust, will seek passage 
on their cars and provide suitable platforms or steps for that purpose.”229 
 In the jury charge on the second issue, contributory negligence, the train 
company asked for and received a “reasonable woman” instruction.  That is, 
the jury was charged to find the plaintiff contributorially negligent if her 
attempt to get on the train, from the east side and without help, was the result 
of a “failure or neglect to exercise such care, caution, and foresight as a 
woman of ordinary care, caution, and foresight would have exercised.”230  In 
addition, however, the judge read a charge requested by the plaintiff that 
phrased the standard in the masculine, defining negligence as “the lack of 
such care and caution as reasonable and prudent men would exercise under 
like circumstances.”  On appeal, the train company claimed that this 
linguistically masculine instruction was reversible error because a “reasonable 
man” might well take risks a reasonable woman would refuse, and if the 
plaintiff took such risks, she was contributorially negligent. 
                         
227Eichorn, 32 S.W. at 994. 
228Mrs. Eichorn was in the early stages of pregnancy; apparently seven-and-a-half months 
later she gave birth to stillborn twins.  See Welke, Unreasonable Women, supra note 15, at 
385. 
229Eichorn, 32 S.W. at 997. 
230Id. at 996. 
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 The Missouri Supreme Court gave little credence to the defendant’s 
argument, noting briefly only that “the jury would have been utterly unfit to 
try any case if they did not understand that ‘men’ in this instruction was 
generic and embraced women.”231  The opinion indicates that the court did not 
think that the jury charge’s linguistically masculine standard instructed the 
jury to assess the plaintiff’s behavior by comparison to a man’s behavior, a 
comparison that the court seems to have agreed would have been 
inappropriate.  Nor did the court agree with the railroad’s argument that the 
plaintiff should have been held to an expressly feminine standard of care — a 
standard that would have incorporated norms of feminine timidity.  Rather, 
the court seems to have believed that the jury was instructed to compare Mrs. 
Eichorn’s behavior to that of a gender-neutral reasonable person, and the 
court approved this standard.232 
 
C.  Conclusion 
 
 When they confronted gender difference in the context of the 
boarding/alighting cases, common law courts, influenced by the concept of 
common carriage, held that even when women’s needs were different from 
men’s, those needs could be reasonable, and should be respected.  At the same 
time, they allowed railroads to escape liability for what the courts considered 
discourteous behavior, where the claim of negligence would impose on 
railroads a time-consuming duty, and no special circumstances existed 
making the discourtesy a large obstacle to safe train or streetcar travel. The 
tort system in this period and these contexts frequently first noticed women’s 
needs and their ability to take care, to exercise prudence, and to behave 
reasonably, and then balanced women’s needs against those of other actors.   
No less important, courts required, and therefore acknowledged, that women 
act reasonably.  Courts included in their analyses the very real restrictions on 
women’s agility, which rendered them less able to avoid harm than men, but 
refused to hold women to a norm of timidity. 
 
 
                         
231Id. at 997. 
232Other evidence in the opinion supports my interpretation that the court thought that 
actual gender - neutrality, rather than either masculinity or femininity, was the generally 
appropriate standard for contributory negligence.  The court pointedly used the neuter in its 
description of another case’s holding, even though that case was about a man, describing 
contributory negligence in terms of the conduct of “an ordinarily prudent person.”  Id. at 996.  
This choice of words must have been a considered one, because only a page later, in a context 
where women were categorically excluded — fact-finding — the court wrote that “only when 
the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same inference from them” should a 
judge take a case from the jury.  Of course, even if gender-neutrality was the goal, it may be 
that it was an impossible one, particularly since women were excluded from both fact-finding 
and law-giving.  Nonetheless, it is worth noticing that the court here was attempting gender-
neutrality, and upholding a finding for the female plaintiff. 




 This Article has examined in some detail reported court opinions between 
1860 and 1930 that arose out of three fact patterns.  The cases show that 
common law courts, far from naively erasing gender by subsuming women 
into the male category of “reasonable men” or a purportedly neutral, but no 
less male category of “reasonable persons,” actually treated gender as an 
important factor in assessing appropriate standards of care, where perceived 
gender difference was highlighted.  A careful exploration of the complex 
interplay of tort doctrine, statutory law, and ideas about gender yields a 
paucity of exclusionary rhetoric, a good deal of careful line-drawing relating 
to women’s reasonable needs, and quite a lot of law favorable to the actual 
women claimants.  One reason for the unexpected woman-friendliness in the 
texts of these opinions might be that men, as the nearly-universal 
decisionmakers, imposed a masculine norm so pervasive that it merited no 
comment.  Holmes wrote in The Common Law of “[t]he ideal average prudent 
man, whose equivalent the jury is taken to be in many cases, and whose 
culpability or innocence is the supposed test.”233  In a legal culture in which 
lay fact finders were considered able to decide cases because they were 
themselves the measure of their own inquiry, a world in which only men 
served as finders of fact or law,234 it would not be surprising that the creators 
of the reasonable man, the common lawyers of the nineteenth century, had no 
anxiety about his maleness, and therefore failed to discuss it more 
frequently.235  But another explanation for the fact that, at least in these cases, 
turn-of-the-century tort law decisions cases that discussed gender rarely 
stigmatized or excluded women is that perhaps there was less exclusion of 
women than has been assumed. 
                         
233HOLMES, supra note 19, at 111; see also, e.g., Hainlin v. Budge, 47 So. 825, 832 (Fla. 
1908) (in applying the standard of the “reasonably prudent man,” “the judge or the juryman 
[has] . . . in his mind a concrete individual who is no less a person than himself”).  But see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965) (“The reasonable man . . . is not to be 
identified with any real person; and in particular he is not to be identified with the members of 
the jury, individually or collectively.”). 
234Women jurors, though not completely nonexistent toward the end of this Article’s 
period, were exceedingly rare.  See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289 (1947); R. Justin 
Miller, The Woman Juror, 2 OR. L. REV. 30 (1922). And women judges were even rarer.  See 
Larry Berkson, Women on the Bench: A Brief History,  65 JUDICATURE  286 (1982). 
235This kind of exclusivity, of course, is not an unusual feature of legally -sanctioned 
positive description.  Catherine MacKinnon, for example, writes that the “point of view [of 
male dominance] is the standard for point-of-viewlessness, its particularity the meaning of 
universality.”  Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 638 - 39 (1983); see also Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking 
Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 893 (1989) (“male-based perspectives, images, and experiences are 
often taken to be the norms in law”). 
